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ABSTRACT
PLANNING GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS: THE CREATION OF REGULATORY
INCENTIVES FOR EFFICIENT PROVISION OF ELECTRICITY
by Dwight Cooper Alpern
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Master of City Planning of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, June 1975
Because of their monopoly control over the generation,
transmission, and distribution of electricity, a virtual necessity
of modern life and an essential element of land and indus-
trial development, electric utilities have traditionally been
subject to more comprehensive government regulation than other
industrial companies. Electric utilities are required by law
to provide adequate electric service sufficient to satisfy
public energy needs at just and reasonable rates. State
and federal regulatory agencies review utility rates and service
to ensure that this responsibility is met. But in most cases
electric utilities in the United States are privately owned
and operated and thus are constitutionally protected from
deprivation of property without due process.
Particularly in light of public concern over rising utility
rates, the regulatory process must be designed to encourage
efficient provision of electricity. The public is unlikely to
accept necessary increases in utility rates unless it is con-
vinced that the utility companies are required to service public
needs at the lowest possible cost. Any system of regulatory
incentives for efficiency must take account of the dual,
public-private character of the electric utilities.
Only in an inflationary economy does the traditional rate
regulatory process create strong incentives for efficiency and
in some conditions excessive investment in capital goods may be
inadvertantly encouraged. While no single method of regu-
lation seems likely to ensure maximum efficiency,-efficiency
incentives could be increased through a program of : strict
disallowance of inefficient operating expenditures; review of
the feasibility and efficiency of major capital investments
prior to construction (possibly coupled with the use of
performance standards) and exclusion of inefficient invest-
ments from the rate base; and rewarding of extra margins of
return based on the degree of efficiency achieved.
Thesis Supervisor: William C. Wheaton
Title: Assistant Professor of Economics and Urban Studies and
Planning
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I INTRODUCTION
Just as the planning profession has expanded its scope be-
yond physical land use planning to include concern with health
care delivery, education, poverty, and environment, planners
cannot afford to be oblivious to the increasing cost and un-
availability of energy, an essential element in urban and
industrial development. As in these other areas planners must
be concerned that government institutions dealing with energy
problems are designed to serve the public interest. This study
will examine the regulatory commissions, the institutions
most directly concerned with one important segment of the
energy industry, the electric utilities.
While all industrial companies are in some degree
regulated by state and federal government, certain industries,
such as electric utilities, have traditionally been subject
to particularly comprehensive regulation. Because they are
"natural" monopolies controlling a virtual necessity of life,
electric utilities are required by state and ,federal law to
provide the public with adequate service sufficient to satisfy
public electricity needs at just and reasonable rates.
State and federal regulatory bodies review utility rates and
service to ensure that this responsibility is met. And yet, in
most cases, electric utilities have been allowed to remain
private businesses constitutionally protected from deprivation
of property without due process.
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Regulatory bodies have been designed to take account of
this dual character of electric utilities. A major concern of
regulation has been to ensure that the utilities do not earn
monopoly profits but only a reasonable return on their
capital investments. Until recently technological advances and
the low cost of fossil fuels ensured that, despite healthy uti-
lity profits, rates were stable or even declining. Rate
hearings attracted relatively little public attention.
But because of general inflation and rapidly rising
energy costs, the regulatory commissions no longer face a
complacent public. Public resistance to further rates
increases, even increases that may be necessary to ensure a
reasonable return, is now a major factor with which the regu-
latory commissions must contend. The question of whether the
electric utilities are efficient has become particularly
important.
Since, even if the regulatroy process does not encourage
efficiency, management may have incentives for efficiency out-
side of, or even in spite of, the regulatory system, the most
direct way to approach this quesiton would seem to be to
measure the current level of efficiency to determine if it
is satisfactory. Efficiency should be reflected in price
levels since inefficiency causes higher costs requiring higher
prices. However, efficiency is a relative not an absolute
concept; any quantitive measure of efficiency must be com-
pared with some qualitative standard of efficiency if it is
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to have any meaning. Thus, if a utility is able to produce
and deliver electricity at a given price, this price must be
compared with a second price, such as the price charged by
another utility that provides comparable service under
comparable conditions or an optimum price that reflects the
most efficient possible mode of operation under such conditions.
It is the lack of a standard of comparison that makes de-
terminations of utility efficiency difficult.
Since electric utilities are usually granted monopolies
in their 'respective geographic areas, there are rarely any
competing utility companies with which a comparison can be
made. It is questionable whether meaningful comparisons can
be made among utilities in different geographic areas since
differences in their costs may reflect differences in their
service areas rather than in their efficiency. Unless the
cost effects of such factors as load distribution, density of
customers, type of customers (whether industrial and commercial
or residential), economies of scale due to the size of the
service area, and fuel costs can be accounted for, the
variation in cost levels is not a relaible measure of manage-
ment efficiency.2 A company that appears to be more efficient
than a second company, if subject to the same external
conditions as the second company, might be unable to provide
the same amount and quality of service at a lower or even at
the same cost as the second company.
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Even if valid comparisons can be made among utility
companies, conclusions as to their efficiency would be of
limited validity if regulation itself causes inefficiency.
Since all electric utility companies are subject to essentially
the same regulatory process, although conducted by different
governmental bodies, any negative effect the regulatory process
might have on efficiency would be masked by intercompany cost
comparisons. A theoretically possible but impracticable
approach (at least for this study) would be to analyze each
utility company's system and develop an optimum system and an
optimum price with which to compare the existing system and
current rates.
Rather than attempting to directly measure efficiency,
this study will focus on the regulatory process itself to see
what incentives or disincentives it creates for efficiency.
An assumption underlying this approach is that without
sufficient regulatory incentives management will have no reason
to seek to improve its level of efficiency and therefore will
not provide electricity at the lowest possible cost.
Utility management may in fact maximize efficiency because of
professional pride and orientation which offsets any disin-
centives for efficiency that regulations might create.
However, in light of the difficulty of demonstrating that
utilities are efficient much less that management psychology
provides sufficient motivation for maximizing efficiency, it
seems important to have a regulatory process that encourages
-8-
efficiency. Further, the public is, legitimately or not,
skeptical of the efficacy of management commitment to effi-
ciency unless the level of profits is affected by the level of
efficiency. It may be necessary to be able to demonstrate to
the public that the regulatory process effectively rewards
efficiency and punishes inefficiency before the public will
accept rate increases that regulators find to be justified and
necessary.
This study analyzes the efficiency incentives and dis-
incentives created by the traditional procedure for regulation
of utility rates. Although informal discussions, negotiations,
and agreements between the utility company and the commission
underlie decisions made through the formal rate review pro-
cess, the study is confined to the formal process through which
rates are set. Some possible modifications to the traditional
review procedure are then examined as to their effect on
efficiency and as to legal limitations on their implementation.
Utilities are regulated both on the state and federal
level. Under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§791a-828e
(1970), the Federal Power Commission had jurisdiction over
facilities used for interstate sale and transmission of
electricity and reviews all rates and charges in connection
with such sale and transmission. Facilities for generation,
intrastate transmission, and local distribution are left to
state regulation. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §824(b);
see Connecticut Light and Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission,
324 U.S. 515 (1945). Although most~states have by statute cre-
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ated a state regulatory commission with jurisdiction over
public utilities within the respective state, the commissions
in California, Florida, Michigan, and New York are used as
representative examples of rate regulation in this study.
Decisions concerning other state commissions and the Federal
Power Commission are also noted where appropriate.
II THE REGULATORY COMMISSION: A Model of the Rate Regulatory
Process
Regulatory commissions are required by statute3 and case
law to set rates that are "just and reasonable," which the
United States Supreme Court in Federal Power Commission v.
Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944), described as
follows:
"(T)he fixing of 'just and reasonable' rates
involves a balancing of the investor and consumer
interests...the investor interest has a legitimate
concern with the financial integrity of the company whose
rates are being regulated. From the investor or company
point of view it is important that there be enough
revenue not only for operating expenses but also for the
capital costs of the business... the return to the
equity owner should be commensurate with returns on
investments in other enterprises having corresponding
risks. That return, moreover, should be'sufficient to
assure confidence in the financial integrity of the
enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to attract
capital."
Aside from this general standard, the regulatory commissions are
"not bound to the use of any single formula or combination of
formulae in determining rates... Under the statutory standard
of 'just and reasonable' it is the result reached not the
method employed which is controlling... if the total effect of
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the rate order cannot be said to be unjust and unreasonable,
judicial inquiry...is at an end." Federal Power Commission v.
Hope Natural Gas Co.320 U.S. at 602.
Although rates must yield sufficient gross revenue to
cover operating expenses, interest costs, and fair return on
equity investment, the commissions are not required to
accept unreasonable expenditures as operating expenses to be
recovered through permitted rates. Acker v. U.S., 298 U.S.
426 (1935). The capital investment of the utility (which may
be measured by original cost, "fair value," or reproduction cost)
may also be reviewed by the commission as to its reasonableness.
Only capital investment that is "used and useful" in the
regulated business can be included as part of the rate base
on which a return is earned. Denver Union Stockyard Co. v.
U.S., 304 U.S. 470 (1938). The commission may disallow
capital investments for which there is no present or imminent
use. Columbia Gas & Fuel Co. v. Ohio Public Utility Commission,
292 U.S. 398, 406-407 (1934).
In setting just and reasonable rates, most commissions
apply a cost of service analysis. In regard to the Federal
Power Commission see South Carolina Generating Co., 16 FPC
52 (1956), reviewed and remanded on other grounds as South
Carolina Generating Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 249 F.2d
755 (4th Cir. 1957). A representative test period, usually the
twelve months immediately prior to initiation of the rate
review, is selected and expenditures during the period for the
operation of utility facilities are examined as to their
reasonableness and, in some cases, adjusted for anticipated
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future conditions. Unreasonable expenses and unusual expenses
unlikely to be repeated in the future are disallowed.
The cost of acquiring the capital necessary to construct
the utility's facilities is similarly reviewed. The cost of
capital, which is treated as a percentage of the utility's rate
base, includes interest on debt obligations, dividends on
preferred stock, and return on common stock (i.e., dividends
plus undistributed surplus) necessary to attract equity
investors. The cost of capital is a function of the antici-
pated return and risks to the investors providing the capital
and will necessarily vary from case to case. "Ultimately,
the recommended rate of return is an exercise in judgement,
based on educated knowledge of the utility company under
consideration and its relative position (in terms of risk)
vis-a-vis alternative companies competing for capital."4
While the cost of debt and preferred stock is determined by
looking to their average embedded costs (i.e. the average
cost per capital dollar paid by the company for all out-
standing debt or preferred stock respectively), the deter-
mination of the cost of common stock requires an evaluation of
the return currently required by prospective equity investors.
The utility company is then allowed to increase its rates
or required to decrease its rates depending on whether total
allowed operating and capital costs were less than or exceeded
total revenues during the test period. Total test period
revenues may be adjusted for unusual conditions not expected
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to reoccur during the next rate period. (e.g.,City of Pittsburgh
v. Pennsylvania Public Service Commission, 187 Pa. Super. 341,
144 A2d, 648, 658 (1958). Rates are set so that they would
yield in the test period revenues sufficient to cover allowed
expenses.
The rate review process is primarily concerned with the
level of net profit of the utility company and not with the
question of from which customers such profits are realized. Al-
though many state statutes prohibit discriminatory rates(e.g.,
California §728;. Florida § 366.06; Michigan §460.557; New York
§66(5)), rate design (or the variation of rates with the level of
consumption and type (industrial, commercial, or residential)of
customer) is left largely to the companies so long as total
profit for the test year under the requested rates would not
exceed allowed operating and capital costs. Recent concern
over energy conservation has led some commissions to question
traditional rate design policies, such as declining rates per
kilpowatt hour as usage increases. E.g. Michigan Department of
Commerce News Service, p. 267 (January 23, 1975) (Commission
studies on rate structure design including time of day, pricing,
and inverted residential rate). This study is confined to
examining the effect of the process of profit regulation on
company efficiency and does not go into issues of rate design.
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III THE FIRM: Models of Management Behavior
The economic model of competition assumes that in any
given market area there are many producers, each of whom produces
only a very small portion of the total amount of the product that
is demanded, so small in fact that changes in the output of a
single company has no effect on the market price of the product.
Under such conditions the firm must minimize its operating and
capital expenses per unit output in order to survive. Customers
can purchase the same product from any of a large number of
competing firms and will buy from the firm offering the lowest
price. The company's survival depends on its ability to reach
a level of efficiency at least equal to that of its competitors.
If the company must sell at a higher price than other companies
in order to cover its costs, all its customers will switch to
the lower price producers. Even if a company is already as
efficient as or more efficient than its competitors, it must
still be concerned with possible future cost cutting by
competing firms or with the entry of a new firm that can produce
at a lower cost per unit output.
Because of the difficulty of new entry due to the high
cost of duplicating electric generation, transmission, distri-
bution systems and because most commissions assign exclusive
service areas, electric utility companies are not under the same
kind of market pressure as a firm in the competitive model. 5 The
economic model of momopoly provides a better basis for pre-
dicting utility behavior than the competitive model.
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Traditionally, economists have assumed that the monopolist,
like the competitive firm, is a profit maximizer. As the only
supplier of a given product in a particular market, the
monopolist can determine market price by adjusting his output.
He tends to reduce his production, and thus total supply, below
the level in a competitive market in order to raise the market
price to his profit maximizing price, which is higher than the
price a competitive market would yield. As the monopolist
cuts production, the price rises and, his profit per unit sold
increases. But with higher prices there is less demand (de-
pending on the price elasticity of demand) and fewer units
are sold. At some point, i.e., the profit maximizing price,
total profit, which is profit per unit times total units sold,
reaches a maximum.
While his economic survival does not depend on his efficiency,
the level of profits the monopolist will realize varies with
his ability to minimize costs. If his operating and capital
costs decline, he can make more profit per unit while selling
the same number of units by keeping the price the same or make
the same profit per unit but sell more units by reducing his
price.
The monopoly model must be modified if the assumption of
profit maximization is dropped. In an effort to account for
actual business behavior, economists have developed alternative
behavioral assumptions.6 If the managers of a company are not
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major stockholders, the consequent separation of ownership and
management means that the persons with immediate control over the
level of company efficiency are not the prime beneficiaries of
increased profit from cost cutting. The manager is rewarded
for his efforts more by salary, status, power, prestige, and
fringe benefits, which may vary more with the size of the
company than with its profitability, than by dividends and
capital gains from stock. Thus, he may be more interested in
maximizing total sales than net profit. Or he may want to
increase his fringe benefits rather than minimize such costs
in order to minimize company profits.
Further, whether or not the manager is a major stockholder,
he may value his leisure and peace of mind more than the extra
profits possible through constant vigilance over company costs
and therefore may be content with less than maximim possible
profit. Finally, he may accept less than maximim profit because
he fears that such a high level of profits would attract public
attention and result in strict regulation of his profits or
in antitrust actions.
But even under these alternative models of management
behavior, management cannot be completely oblivious to profitability.
While management may not be interested in maximizing profit, the
stockholders would like to maximize the return on their
investment and have the power to remove management when they
are dissatisfied with its performance. But stockholders tend
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to be geographically dispersed and disorganized and not knowledge-
able about the company or its potential for profit. So long as
the level of profit seems to be reasonable, they are not likely
to threaten to remove current management.8 Thus, while management
may not be motivated or pressured to maximize profit, profits and
efficiency must still be kept at a reasonable level so as not to
arouse the stockholders. A management that seeks to maximize sales
may strive for maximum efficiency, depending on the price elasticity
of its product, although it will not limit production to keep the
price at the profit maximizing level.
The validity of the behavioral theories that are alternatives
to the profit maximization assumption seems to depend on the
particular circumstances under which a given manager acts (e.g., the
method of compensation or the value placed on leisure) making it
diffucult to use such theories to draw any general conclusions about
management behavior. Because of the difficulty of applying these
alternative theories and since their predictions of management
behavior differ from those under the profit maximizing model only
after a reasonable level of profit has been reached, this study
will assume that electric utility managements seek to maximize
company profits. However, even with this assumption, the tradi-
tional monopoly model must be modified in order to apply to the
regulated monopolist.
IV INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES FOR EFFICIENCY UNDER THE
REGULATORY MODEL
Before examining how regulation affects management behavior
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and utility efficiency, it is necessary to develop some concept
of what is meant by the term "efficiency." Efficiency can
be viewed both from a short run and a long run perspective.
Short run or operating efficiency involves operation of existing
plants to produce a given output, i.e., sufficient electricity
to meet public needs at a given time, at the minimum cost.
The short run is too brief a period for a utility company
to make any major change in or additions to its physical
plant although adjustments can be made in the use of these
facilities. A company could change the amount of electricity
it generates itself relative to the amount of energy it
purchases from other utility systems or might convert some
plants from one type of fossil fuel to another.
Long run efficiency, or efficiency of capital investment
in physical plant for generation, transmission, and distribution,
involves the choice of the future mix of factor inputs, i.e.,
natural resources, land labor, capital, and technology, which
yields the minimum cost of meeting future public electricity
needs. In the long run physical plant can be significantly
altered; the number and capacity of facilities can be changed
and entirely new technologies can be adopted. A utility
company can also alter the extent to which plant construction
and generation and transmission are coordinated with other
utility systems.
While long run and short run efficiency can be conceptually
distinguished, there is no precise boundary between them.
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Both are reflected in the rates charged by a utility company
at any given time since allowed costs often include both
present operating costs and capital costs on funds borrowed for
the construction of plants not yet in operation. Further,
a company's choice of technology in future capital investments
involves tradeoffs between the required level of capital
investment and cost of operating such facilities once they are
in operation. For example, while nuclear plants require a
larger investment of capital than fossil fueled plants, this
disadvantage may be offset by the lower cost of operating and
fueling the nuclear plant.
A. The Effect of Regulation on Short Run Efficiency
The electric utility company is a monopoly but one which is
subject to state and federal regulation. Electric utilities
have traditionally allowed, or even required, to be monopolies
because they were considered to be "natural" monopolies, i.e.,
monopolies resulting from the nature of the industry rather
than from any anticompetitive conduct on the part of management.
If competition were allowed in such an industry and the
companies did not refrain from vigorous competition, the
economies of scale inherent in the technology of the industry
presumably dictate that eventually monopolies would emerge.
But in the interim the public would suffer from: either
destructive competition resulting in prices so low that no
company would have sufficient revenue to ensure safe and
adequate service or prices higher than if economies of scale
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were fully realized; concentration of companies in lucrative
markets resulting in lack of service in less lucrative markets
(a process known as "cream skimming"); and in unnecessary and
costly duplication of massive capital investments such as
generating plants and transmissions lines.9 But in the absence
of competition government regulation was considered necessary
to prevent the utility company from acting like a monopolist,
i.e., reducing output and increasing price above the competitive
level in order to realize a monopoly profit. The regulatory
commission requires that service to the public be adequate to
meet public needs and limits the rates that can be charged so
that only a reasonable profit is earned. Rates must cover
operating and interest costs and yield only a reasonable rerurn
on equity which is at least equal to -the cost of attracting
capital investment.
Although the commission has the power to disallow expenses
it considers unreasonable, commission give their principal
attention to limitation of profits rather than costs1 0
so the regulated company operates under virtually a cost plus
contract. The utility seems to have no incentive to reduce
operating costs since the return allowed by the commission
does not vary with the level of costs but is solely a function
of the cost of capital and the amount of the rate base. (The
feasibility and effect on efficiency of strict disallowance of
inefficient operating and capital expenditures will be examined
along with other possible modifications of the rate setting
-20-
process. See infra. section IV(A)).
However, rates are set prior to the provision of the
service for which they may be charged and are set so as to
cover an estimate of the operating costs for the future rate
period. The utility can increase its profits by reducing total
operating costs per kilowatt hour below the level anticipated
by the rate makers. For example, if in the test year operating
expenses are $1,000, output is 100 kilowatthours, capital
investment is $10,000, and the cost of capital is 10% (5% going
to debt holders and 5% to equity holders), total allowed
revenue equals $2,000 and the average kilowatthour will be
priced at $20. This price embodies a ratio of $10 operating
expenses and $100 capital investment per kilowatthour. If
output is doubled without additional capital investment and
operating expenses increased only 50%, gross revenues under the
current rates will total $4,000, net revenues equal $15,000,
and the ratio of operating expenses to output declines to $7.50
per kilowatthour. The rate of return on total' capital investment
increases to 15%, with return to equity rising to 10%. Rates
embody both the test year ratio of operating expenses to output (or
operating cost ratio) and the test year ratio of capital investment
to output (or capital investment ratio) and changes in these ratios
during the rate period from their test year levels result in earned
rates of return different from allowed return. See, North
Carolina ex rel. Utilities Commission v. Morgan, 278 N.C.
235, 179 S.E.2d 419, 420-421(1971),. A decrease in the operating
-21-
cost ratio results in an increased earned return if there is no
offsetting increase in the capital investment ratio.
Profits earned above the expected reasonable rate of
return are revenues from rates which the commission by statute
could allow to become effective only after finding them to be
just and reasonable. Such excess profits are the exclusive
property of the utility and cannot be recaptured by the com-
mission attempting to retroactively repeal its own enactment.
Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railway
Co., 284 U.S. 370, 389 (1932). Similarly, if the utility is
unable to earn the profit allowed by the commission this deficit
cannot be made up by a more than reasonable allowed return for
the next rate period although it will certainly influence the
commission's decision as to what is a reasonable level of
allowed costs or return for the next rate period.
The incentive to cut costs is dampened by the fact that
the lower operating cost ratio actually realized in the rate
period will then be reflected in estimated operating expenses
on which rates for the next rate period will be based. The
savings from increased operating efficiency will then be
passed on entirely to the public in the form of lower rates
and will no longer benefit the company.
Only if the company is able to constantly reduce costs will
its profits continue to be greater than that of a less efficient
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company. In a competitive market the firm that succeeds in
making certain cost reductions retains a profit advantage
until its competitors are able to achieve comparable economies.
The regulated monopolist must in effect compete with his own
previous performance rather than with the performance of other
firms. The utility with the highest profit is not the one
which is the most efficient but the one that has most improved
its efficiency over its last test period. And that utility
will then find that if it only maintains and does not further
improve on this level of efficiency, its profit for the next
period will drop back to its cost of captial, the same return
that is allowed for utility companies of average efficiency.
But commissions are not required to review rates unless a
utility company files a request for a change in the rates or
a consumer complains that current rates are not just and reason-
able. During periods of declining or stable costs and technology
rate reviews may be relatively infrequent.12 Further, since the
rate review procedure is lengthy and complex, there are often
long delays between changes in actual operating costs since the
rates were last reviewed and compensating adjustments through
new rates. And the test period on which the new rates are
based may not fully reflect costs at the time the rate review
process is completed since the test period, consisting of the 12
months immediately prior to the initiation of the rate review,
may be outdated if costs continue to change during the long
rate hearings. The longer the delay in reflecting full costs, or
regulatory lag, the greater the amount of profits that can be
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retained as a result of lower than expected costs and the
greater the incentive to cut costs. On the other hand, when
inflation of costs during the lag period threatens the firm's
ability to earn even the "reasonable" return allowed by the
commission to cover the company's cost of capital, the pres-
sure on the utility to be more efficient becomes comparable
to the pressure competing firms put on each other; the regulated
utility must be efficient in order to survive. In recent
years many utilities have been unable to earn their allowed
return even though rate reviews have been more frequent than
in previous years when costs were relatively stable or declining.
Thus, regulation seems to create some incentive for greater
operating efficiency. This incentive is particularly strong
when a company faces long regulatory lag during an inflationary
period. However, this incentive is largely the result of
weaknesses in the regulatory system rather than of a conscious
institutional effort to induce efficiency. While these
weaknesses strengthen incentives for efficiency, they also have
the undesirable result of making it difficult for utilities to
earn a reasonable return during an inflationary period regardless
of how efficient they are. Recognizing this problem, many
commissions have begun to make changes in their regulatory
procedure. Rate review is being streamlined and simplified
in order to reduce regulatory lag. Reform has been proded by
statutes limiting the time within which state regulatory
commissions must make their final rate determinations (e.g.,
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Michigan §460.6a(3) (Supplement 1974); New York §66(12) (Sup-
plement 1974)) and by court decisions requiring that test
year expenses truly reflect future expected costs and that
rates of return include a margin for the effects of inflation
on operating expenses.13 Some commissions now make adjustments
in the test year costs to account for future inflation.1 4
Often fuel cost increases are passed on directly to the customers
through fuel adjustment clauses without any prior rate hearings.15
While these reforms will make it more likely that utilities
will be able to earn their allowed return since allowed rates
will more accurately reflect actual costs for the period
during which they are effective, they will also reduce the
pressure on management for greater short run efficiency.
B. The Effect of Regulation on Long Run Efficiency
Just as a company can realize excess profits by reducing
its operating cost ratio, return can be increased by a reduction
in the capital investment ratio. The commission estimates the
dollar cost of capital by multiplying a percentage cost of
capital times the average or year end test period rate base.
No estimate is made of additional capital investments to be
made in the future period and percentage cost of capital is
based on the embedded cost of debt and preferred stock and on
the current cost of common stock (i.e., the return equity investors
would demand on the next additional share).
The commission apparently assumes that the cost of acquiring
additional capital will not vary significantly with the amount
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of new capital investment to be made by the company during the
rate period. Perhaps this assumption is necessary because
estimates of the cost of capital are too imprecise for adjust-
ment to be made for the effect of varying amounts of additional
capital investment. Also the amount of addition to the rate base
in the future is somewhat speculative since commissions include
in the rate base only completed physical plant and sometimes
either the value of plant under construction or interest pay-
ments on plant in construction. E.g., Shevin v. Yarborough,
274 So.2d 505, 510 (1973). Companies are often unable to meet
their construction schedules. But see Rochester Gas and
Electric Corp., 96 PUR 3d 475, 480 (New York Public Service
Commission 1972) (permitting nonrevenue producing facilities to
be completed in the near future to be included in the current
rate base).
The commission also assumes that the ratio of capital invest-
ment to kilowatthour output will remain the same during the rate
period as during the test year. If, as in the- previous example,
the test year operating expenses are $1,000, output is 100 kilo-
watthours, capital investment is $10,000, and the cost of
capital is 10%, total allowed revenue equals $2,000 and the average
kilowatthour will be priced at $20. This price embodies an
assumption of a capital investment ratio of $100 per kilowatthour.
If the ratio is reduced, e.g., if new physical facilities pro-
duce more kilowatthours per dollar invested than existing facil-
ities, without any rate increase company return would increase to
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the extent that the reduced capital investment ratio is not offset
by an increase in the operating cost ratio. If new plant which
doubles output costs only $5,000, revenues under current rates
will total $4,000 and the capital investment ratio will decline
to $75 per kilowatthour. If operating expenses per kilowatthour
increase only proportionately with output so that net revenues
equal $2,000, the rate of return on total capital investment of
$15,000 increases to 13.3%, with the increase going to the equity
holders. Thus, a company may realize excess profits by reducing
the capital investment ratio, i.e., by increasing the efficiency
of their capital investment decisions.
As in the case of operating expenses, the incentive to
maximize efficiency is weakened by the fact that savings from a
reduced capital investment ratio are realized only until the
commission reviews current rates and adjusts them to reflect
the capital investment ratio. But regulatory lag lengthens the
time during which savings can be retained.
Further, if allowed return on capital ex6eeds the cost of
capital, overinvestment in capital goods may be inadvertantly
rewarded sufficiently to offset any potential savings from
capital investment efficiency. Since the dollar amount of
profit varies with the dollar amount of capital invested, if the
cost of attracting additional capital is less than the return on
additional capital allowed by the commission, the company has an
incentive to use more capital than the amount that would achieve
maximum long run efficiency. In effect, the cost to the company
of using additional capital is reduced by a subsidy allowed by the
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commission in the form of an inflated estimate of the future cost
of capital. It is to the benefit of the company to extract this
subsidy from the public so long as the price, indluding the
subsidy, that is charged to the public is lower than what would
be the profit maximizing price if the company were an unregulated
monopolist. If the price remains below the profit maximizing
price, any reduction in demand resulting from a higher than
necessary price is more than offset by the greater profit per
unit sold and the company can increase its total dollar profits
16by overinvesting. Since the cost of capital is the return in-
vestors would earn on other investments of comparable risk and
the allowed return is above the cost of capital, the company is
able to earn for its shareholders a return on economically inef-
ficient investments that is higher than they could earn on
alternative investments of similar risk.
If the commission correctly estimates the cost of captial
for the rate period, there is no incentive for management to
overinvest in capital goods. But, as noted earlier, the deter-
mination of the cost of capital, particularly that portion relating
to the return to equity, cannot be precise and is more in the
nature of a judgement or rough educated guess than a calculation.
The likelihood of a commission erring on the high or low side
would seem to depend at least in part on the economic and polit-
ical pressures on the commission at the time of the rate hearings.
If company has had difficulty selling its securities or must raise
large amounts of new capital, the commission might tend to add
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a margin to its estimate of the cost of equity in order to be
on the safe side. On the other hand, a public concerned
with inflation may bring strong pressure against rate increases
with the result that the commission sets return on the low side.
Further, a margin between actual cost of capital and allowed
return on capital will create an incentive for overinvestment
only if the company is able to earn in the rate period a return
equal to the allowed rate of return (or at least higher than
the actual cost of capital) on the enlarged rate base. Two
conditions are necessary for the company to earn the allowed
return. First, the commission must permit the company to raise
rates after the additional capital investment is made. 18 Since
current rates are based on the test period capital investment
ratio and overinvestment by definition increases the amount of
capital per kilowatthour, rates must be increased if the high
allowed rate of return is to be earned on the increased rate base.
For example, if in the test year operating expenses are
$1,000, output is 100 kilowatthours, capital investment is
$10,000, the cost of capital is 10%, and allowed return is 15%,
the average kilowatthour is priced at $25 and the capital invest-
ment ratio is $100 per kilowatthour. If new facilities are
constructed that double output but cost $20,000 and the operating
ratio remains constant, net revenues under current rates will
total $3,000. Earned rate of return on the new total capital
investment of $25,000 is only 10%, which is equal to the cost of
capital. The company has reduced its rate of return below what
it would have otherwise earned since it can realize an excess
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rate of return on its new investment only after rates are
increased. The longer the lag between rate adjustments, the
longer the period of reduced rate of return. Until rates are
increased, overinvestment could increase the capital investment
ratio sufficiently to reduce earned return below the cost of
capital, e.g., if the new facilities in the example cost more
than $20,000. The company must sacrifice a temporarily reduced
rate of return for future excess return and presumably will be
reluctant to overinvest to the point that earned return is
below the cost of capital for any significant period of time.
A second condition for earning allowed return is that
operating costs allowed by the commission must be at least as
high as actual operating costs until the next time the commission
revises rates. Since any excess of actual costs over the
allowed costs reduces actual return, inflation of costs that
is not anticipated in the level of operating costs allowed by
the commission will reduce the ability of the company to earn a
rate of return greater than its cost of capital. In recent years
many utilities have not been able to earn their allowed return
because of inflation and lag in regulatory response to cost
increases. 9 Even if allowed rate of return is set higher than
the cost of capital, the earned rate of return may be below the
cost of capital and the incentive for overinvestment eliminated.
Commissions have tried to reduce the adverse effect of
inflation on earned rates of return by permitting rates to
increase monthly with increases in the cost of fuel through
fuel adjustment clauses. Since increases in fuel costs can be
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recovered almost immediately and often without a hearing while
increases in capital costs can be recovered only through
lengthy, public rate hearings, there may even be some manage-
ment bias toward new facilities that are less rather than more
capital intensive if a company is unable or unwilling to sustain
short term reductions in rate of return. But reforms reducing
regulatory lag as to other operating and capital costs increases
the likelihood that allowed return can be realized on over-
investment and reduces the period of depressed return created by
an increased capital investment ratio.
Overinvestment in an inflationary period may be undesirable
for a second reason. Because of public sensitivity to price
increases, the utilities may find it necessary to maximize long
run efficiency in order to keep to a minimum the rate increases
they will need and so increase the likelihood that the commission
will grant increases that are unavoidably necessary. As a result
of growing demand for electricity (which continues to grow
although, because of recent energy conservation and economic
recession, at a lower rate than that of previous years), infla-
tion of construction costs, new standards for environmental
protection, and the need to convert from usage of increasingly
scarce fossil fuels, the electric utilities will need vast amounts
of new capital if they are to meet public energy needs. 20
Without increased rates the companies may be unable to acquire
this needed capital.
In order to attract capital, a utility must have sufficient
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return to capital. Long term capital is raised primarily through
the sale of bonds and common stock (and to some extent preferred
stock). A prime determinant of interest on utility bonds in the
bond rating assigned by bond rating companies, which grade bonds
according to risk of default on repayment on principal and
interest. The higher the rating, the lower the interest demanded
by prospective purchasers of the bonds. Ratings depend heavily
on the ratio of net income before interest to total interest
payments owed by the company (which is known as the income
ratio) .21 Inflation brings a rise in interest for new bonds
issued by the company and in interest on short term borrowing
as well as an increase in operating costs, all of which increases
reduce income coverage and so threaten the rating of the
company's bonds unless revenues are increased sufficiently through
a rate increase. If the rating of the company's are downgraded, the
consequent increase in interest necessary to sell bonds only
further threatens income coverage. This vicious cycle may
culminate in the reduction of income coverage to the point where
no further bonds can be sold.
Bonds are issued under a bond indenture, which is essentially
a contract between (1) existing and prospective bondholders repre-
sented by a trustee (usually a bank) and (2) the company, in which
the company makes certain promises in order to induce purchase of
the bonds. In most cases the indenture provides that the bonds
be secured by the physical assets of the company and that add-
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itional bonds may be issued from time to time as the company
adds new physical assets so long as the amount of additional bonds
is limited to a given percentage of the additional physical assets. 2 2
The indentures also usually require that a minimum income cover-
age ratio be maintained before additional bonds can be issued.2 3
This provision will prevent a utility from issuing bonds if its
income coverage ratio had been eroded to the minimum level. 24
The electric utilities have experienced a downward trend in both
25 26income coverage and bonds ratings since 1965 and in many cases
are approaching the minimum coverage required by their outstanding
indentures.
Reduced income coverage also reduces the attractiveness of
utility stock since it increases the risk that there will be
insufficient income after interest to yield the return on equity
anticipated by the equity holders. Because of this increased
risk potential stockholders demand greater return per dollar that
they invest. In order to induce them to purchase stock the
utility must lower the price of its shares, increasing the earn-
ings per invested dollar since each share is entitled to the same
percentage of net earnings regardless of the price paid for the
share.
A second cause of the demand for higher return to equity and
thus lower share prices is the general rise in what can be
earned through other investments, e.g., the rise in interest rates
on utility bonds or bonds in other industries. Bonds have a
legal claim prior to equity's claim to earning in that dividends
and earned surplus are the residue of gross income once operating
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costs and bonds interest are paid.and distributions are discre-
tionary. Since bond holders also have a prior claim to company
assets if the company goes into bankruptcy and reoganization
(Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-799 (1970)), the equity
holder bears a greater risk than the bond holder and so demands
some margin of return over bond interest to compensate for that
risk. As interest rates rise, return to equity must also rise
to maintain that margin.
But if the price of new shares falls below the net assets
or book value per share, the holdings of current shareholders are
diluted. Dilution takes place when the earnings per share
decline. Since the allowed return on equity is fixed by the
commission for a given rate period, earnings per share will not
rise unless the commission increases the allowed equity return by
raising rates (or unless the level of operating or investment
efficiency is improved). If shares are sold below book value, the
company's earnings must be divided among a greater number of share-
holders but these earnings will not increase proportionally
with the increase in share holders since the newest shareholders
contributed less capital per share on which the company earns the
allowed return. For example, while the number of shares is
increased by 10%, the amount of capital and thus the amount of
allowed earnings increases less than 10%. The share holder who
paid an amount equal to or greater than book value for his shares
has lower earnings per share than he had prior to the sale of
stock at below book value. Many utilities have found it neces-
sary to offer their new shares at a price below book value to
-34-
attract investors.
But prospective investors may become reluctant to purchase
utility shares even at such a low price if the utility's earn-
ings do not seem likely to improve in the near future. Although
it is the current shareholder's holdings that are being diluted
in order to attract the prospective investor, when the company
attempts to raise further equity in the future, the company may
have to offer shares at a price even lower than the current
below book price, diluting the shares that are currently being
offered. As a result, investors may be reluctant to buy the
shares at any price unless the commission increases allowed
return. 27
Although commissions are legally required to set rates to
yield a return at least equal to the cost of capital so that the
companies can raise needed capital, commissions have significant
discretion in setting return to capital since the "cost of cap-
ital" is such an imprecise concept. And the courts will not
substitute their judgement for that of the commission but will
uphold commission decisions so long as they are supported by the
evidence. The actual return earned by the company in the period
for which the rates are set is also affected by the commission's
determination of what costs will be recognized, a decision which
also involves significant discretion. Any excess of actual costs
over allowed costs must come out of allowed earnings. A commis-
sion that is pressed by public concern over rising utility rates
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may tend to resolve questions of the appropriate level of
allowed costs and return on the low side. But the lower the rate
increase requested, the more likely the commission will grant the
amount requested and amounts requested in the future. Since it is
therefore in the interests of the company to minimize the rate
increases it needs, the company will not be able to afford the
luxury of overinvestment to increase the rate base.
In summary, in an inflationary economy with public hostil-
ity to rate increases, the incentive to increase the rate base
in order to increase allowed earnings is reduced. The companies
have sufficient difficulty raising essential capital without
adding to that burden through overinvestment, and they can
realize savings by reducing the capital investment ratio below
the ratio embodied in the rates until the next rate review.
Regulatory reforms that reduce the financial pressure on utili-
ties also reduce the need for investment efficiency. Thus, as
in the case of short run efficiency, the incentive for long run
efficiency is the result of the regulatory system faltering in
the face of inflation rather than the result of a conscious effort
to encourage efficiency.
V. REGULATORY METHODS OF INDUCING EFFICIENCY
It seems desirable that the rate regulation process be de-
signed to encourage short run and long run efficiency in the
generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity.
Six possible methods of inducing efficiency through the regu-
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latory process will be examined as to their economic effect and
their administrative and legal feasibility.
A. Disallowance of Unreasonable Operating Expenditures
Most state regulatory commissions are required by statute to
ensure that the public receives adequate service at reasonable
rates. Since operating costs, including taxes consume a major
portion of gross revenues (72% as of 1972) 28, it would seem that
the body charged with limiting rates to a "reasonable" level
should concern itself with the reasonableness and economy of
test year operating expenses claimed by the utility and which,
if not disallowed for some reason, must be covered by rates for
the future rate period.
When a portion or all of a particular test period expendi-
ture is disallowed for rate purposes, revenues earned during the
test period are not affected. Such revenues are the proceeds of
rates which the commission previously determined to be just and
reasonable so that the commission has no authority to reduce
past revenues by the amount of expenditures now found to be
unreasonable. However, the utility has an incentive not to repeat
the disallowed expenditure in the next rate period. Since the
new rates only provide sufficient revenue to cover the lower
allowed level of expenditures plus a given rate of return,
expenditures above that level must come out of allowed return.
Whether or not a commission disallows inefficient operating
expenditures, company incentive to seek out on its own initiative
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means of minimizing operating expenditures is weakened by the fact
that the company retains the savings from reduced expenditures only
until the next rate review. If the commission carefully eliminates
unnecessary and inefficient expenditures from allowed operating
expenses, the company is forced to reduce expenditures which the
commission finds have not been reduced to a reasonable level.
Historically the ability of regulatory commissions to disallow
operating expenditures made by the utility companies has been
limited by federal due process as interpreted by the courts. Although
the public utilities are burdened with statutory duties to the public
and are subject to public regulation, they are in most cases privately
owned and constitutionally protected from deprivation of property
without due process so that the investors' interest in receiving
return on their capital investment cannot be ignored by the
regulatory commission. Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural
Gas Co., 320 U.S. at 603; Bluefield Water Works and Improvement
Co. v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia, 262 U.S. 679,
692 (1922); Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Co. v. Minnesota,
134 U.S. 418, 454 (1889). The right to property was interpreted to
include the right to use one's property as one saw fit. Thus, the
commission was to protect the public interest but had not right to
substitute its judgment for that of the owners and management. The
public through the commission was not to act as the general
manager of the regulated company since it was not "clothed with
the general power of management incident to ownership."
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State of Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v.
Missouri Public Service Commission, 262 U.S. 276, 289 (1923).
See also Chicago Milwaukee and St. Paul Railroad Co. v. Wiscon-
sin, 238 U.S. 491, 501 (1915); Interstate Commerce Commission
v. Chicago Great Western Railway Co., 209 U.S. 108. 118 (1908).
Since a commission could not interfere with the business
judgement of private management, it could not disregard actual
expenditures made by the company unless such expenditures were
an abuse of discretion because they had been made in bad faith.
State of Missouri ex rel.Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v.
Missouri Public Service Commission, 262 U.S. at 289. By requir-
ing the commission to show bad faith or fraud and not simply bad
judgement, the courts erected a substantial obstacle to the use
of disallowance as a means of inducing management efficiency.
Motivation is always difficult to prove. Further, inefficiency
that is caused by carelessness or laziness or mistake could not
be reached under the Southwestern Bell Telephone standard.
The business judgement doctrine was primarily grounded in an
interpretation of due process that strictly limited the extent
to which the state could interfere with private business and
held that certain substantive areas of private economic activity
were inviolate. The state could not set a minimum wage since
due process included the freedom to negotiate and contract for
employment of labor. Adkins v. Children's Hospital of the
District of Columbia, 261 U.S. 525 (1923). Similarly, a stat-
ute limiting the hours per day that employees could work was con-
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trary to due process. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
But because the Supreme Court found that the doctrine of sub-
stantive due process required the Court to judge the desirability
of statutory efforts to solve economic and social problems and
to impose its economic and social philosophy on legislatures, the
Court revised its due process standard. Rather than prohibiting
the legislatures from intervening in certain substantive areas,
the Court would uphold statutes if they had a reasonable relation
to a proper legislative purpose and were not arbitrary or dis-
criminatory. E.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1933)
(holding that fixing of prices of businesses that are not public
utilities is not per se unconstitutional); West Coast Hotel v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (upholding a minimum wage
statute for women and overruling Adkins); U.S. v. Carolene Pro-
ducts Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (upholding a statutory ban
on shipment of milk mixed with nondairy fats or oils); Olsen v.
Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 246 (1941) (upholding a statutory
limitation on the fee charged to job applicants by private
employment agencies); Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern
Iron and Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536 (1949) (upholding a state
constitutional amendment forbidding denial of employment for
failure to join a union); Day Brite Lighting Inc. v. Missouri,
342 U.S. 421 (1952) (upholding a statute entitling employees to
be absent from work without deduction in pay in order to vote);
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488
(1955) (upholding a statute making it unlawful for persons
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other than licensed opthalmologists or optomologists to fit or
replace lenses and prohibiting sale of eye glasses by use of adver-
tising and rental of space in retail stores to offer eye exam-
inations).
With substantive due process largely removed as an obstacle
to state intervention in economic activity (except where such inter-
vention encroaches on rights specifically protected by the first
ten amendments to the Constitution 29) the limitations on dis-
allowance of expenditures also were loosened. While in South-
western Bell Telephone the Court refused to allow a commission to
disallow payments made by a utility to its parent company, in
Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone, 282 U.S. 133 (1930), the Court
held that a commission need not prove bad faith in order to dis-
allow payments by a utility to its parent but could inquire into
the reasonableness of the net earnings of the parent from such
transactions. A showing that the price charged was no more than
that charged by independent sources could be treated as insuf-
ficient to establish reasonableness.
The case of payments by a subsidiary to its parent company
seems to be a particularly easy case for allowing commission
inquiry beyond determination of whether expenditures were made in
good faith. If, as was the case in Smith, the subsidiary is
subject to state regulation of its profits but the parent is
outside the jurisdiction of the state, statutory limitations on
rates and profit can be easily circumvented if the profit earned
by the parent from services and materials provided to its
subsidiary is automatically included in the allowed expenses
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of the subsidiary, The parent company could charge the sub-
sidiary, and indirectly the public serviced by the subsidiary,
a price which includes a monopoly profit and which the sub-
sidiary would not be allowed to charge if the subsidiary , rather
than the parent, would retain such profit. The shareholders who
own both the subsidiary and the parent are indifferent as to
whether they earn excess profits through the subsidiary or through
the parent and the public is harmed- to the same degree regard-
less of which entity is allowed to retain the excess. Because
of this clear opportunity for abuse, the Court held that a com-
mission could require a showing of the reasonableness of such
transactions "although this may involve a presentation of evi-
dence which would not be required in the case of parties dealing
at arm's length and in the general and open market subject to
the usual safeguards of bargaining and competition." Western
Distributing Co. v. Public Service Commission of Kansas, 285
U.S. 119 (1932).
However, the loosening of due process restrictions on dis-
allowance was not limited to transactions between subsidiary and
parent. In Acker v. U.S.,298 U.S. at 431, the Court upheld a
disallowance of certain expenses on the grounds that they had
been found to be "extravagant and wasteful." Although this
involved state interference with matters of managerial judgement,
regulation could not be "frustrated by a requirement that the
rate be made to compensate extravagant or unnecessary costs."
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Also see Chicago and Grand Trunk Railway Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S.
339, 346 (1892). Commission judgment as to the proper allowances
would be unheld so long as they were not "without substantial
support in the record." Acker v. U.S., 298 U.S. at 431.
Thus, the substantive due process test was transformed into
largely a procedural requirement. The commission could not
simply substitute its judgment for that of the management but
had to show substantial evidence of inefficiency, improvidence,
or negligence before it could disallow expenditures that manage-
ment had determined to be necessary. The courts would overturn
any disallowance lacking a basis in evidence. West Ohio Gas Co.
v. Public Utility Commission of Ohio (No. 1), 294 U.S. 63 (1935).
State commissions have disallowed all or a portion of
various types of expenditures. Transactions between affiliates
are closely scrutinized and in some cases are disallowed to the
extent that the unregulated affiliate earns a profit greater than
that allowed to the regulated utility. Pacific Telephone and
Telegraph Co. v. California Public Utilities Commission, 44 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 401 P.2d 353, 58 PUR3d 229 (1965); Southern Bell Tele-
phone Co., 66 PUR3d 1, 37 (Florida Public Service Commission,
1966); Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 85 PUR3d 467, 474 (Michigan
Public Service Commission 1970); General Telephone Co. of
Upstate New York, Inc. v. Lundy, 17 N.Y. 2d 373, 271 N.Y. S.2d
216, 218 N.E. 2d 274, 64 PUR3d 302 (1966). Salaries are reviewed
as to their reasonableness. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph
Co. v. California Public Utilities' Commission, 401
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P.2dat260; Florida Crown Utility Services, Inc. v. Utility
Regulatory Board of City of Jacksonville, 274 So. 2d 597, 598
(1973) (but disallowed only if substantial evidence). Adver-
tising and promotional expenses are disallowed if they were
unnecessary. City of Los Angeles v. Public Utilities Commission,
497 P. 2d 785, 102 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1972) (allowed expenses for
advertising that is informative but not for advertising aimed
merely at creating a good public image); Promotional Activities
by Gas and Electric Companies, 68 PUR3d 162 (New York Public
Service Commission 1967). And charitable contributions are
similarly scrutinized. Some states have concluded that contri-
butions should never be included in allowed operating expenses
regardless of the beneficiary or amount. Pacific Telephone and
Telegraph Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of California,
401 P.2d at 374; City of Miami v. Florida Public Service Commis-
sion, 208 So.2d (1968); Detroit Edison Co., 83 PUR3d 463, 488
(Michigan Public Service Commission 1970); Accounting Treatment
for Donations, Dues, and Lobbying Expenditures, 71 PUR3d 440
(New York Public Service Commission 1967).
A further indication that the courts allow the commissions
broad powers in reviewing management decisions is that company
capital structure, which was traditionally considered virtually the
exclusive domain of management, is now recognized by many state
courts as the legitimate concern of the regulatory commissions.
The composition of capital structure affects a company's
cost of capital since debt financing is generally less costly than
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equity financing. The higher cost of equity is a result of both
(1) a higher before tax cost due to the priority of debt's
claim on earnings and assets and (2) the deductibility for tax
purposes of company interest payments (as distinguished from the
treatment of dividends and earned surplus as taxable income).
Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §H 163 and 312 (1970). Be-
cause of the difference in tax treatment, a company taxed at the
50% rate must earn $2 before interest and taxes in order to
retain $1 for every $1 to be paid in interest.
As equity is replaced by debt, the total cost of capital
declines. But as the percentage of debt in the capital structure
increases, the risk of inability to meet interest and principal
payments, and therefore the return required by prospective stock
purchasers, increase. Similarly, interest demanded by prospec-
tive purchasers of additional bonds increases. Thus, as the pro-
portion of debt rises, the savings from greater use of debt
are offset to an increasing extent by a simultaneous rise in the
cost of equity and in bond interest rates due to the greater
investment risk associated with higher debt. After a certain
level of debt is reached, net savings drop to zero and total
cost of capital begins to increase. Given the relationships
between cost of debt and cost of equity and proportion of debt,
there seems to be an optimum or lowest cost capital structure. 30
Many state commissions have concluded that increased use
of debt up to a certain optimum debt percentage reduces the
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total cost of capital and, when determining the cost of capital
and the return to be allowed, have based the estimated cost of
capital for the test period on a hypothetical optimum capital
structure if they felt that the company was overly conservative
in its use of debt financing. State courts have upheld the use
of a hypothetical capital structure because the percentage of
debt financing directly and significantly affects the rate of
return required and thus the level of rates. E.g., Southern
Bell Telephone Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 239
La. 175, 118 So.2d 372,381 (1960) (citing from Alabama, Connec-
ticut, Idaho, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Washington, D.C.).
Further evidence that substantive due process is not an
obstacle to disallowance of inefficient expenditures is provided
by the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§1301-1542 (1970),
which requires that the Civil Aeronautics Board set "reasonable"
rates for carriage of persons and property by air carriers inclu-
ding transportation of mail by aircraft (§§1373, 1374, 1376(a)).
"In fixing and determing fair and reasonable rates (for mail
carriage) ... the Board shall take into consideration, among other
factors.. .the need of each such carrier...for compensation...
sufficient to insure the performance of such service, and to-
gether with all other revenue of the air carrier, to enable such
air carrier under honest, economical, and efficient management,
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to maintain and continue the development of air transportation
to the extent and of the character and quality required for the
commerce of the United States, the Postal Service, and the
national defense. " §1376(b). Thus, the Board is required to
set mail rates sufficient not only to recompense carriers for
their services but also for a "broader, bigger, program in the
national interest." American Overseas Airlines v. Civil Aero-
nautics Board, 254 F.2d 744, 749 (D.C.Cir. 1958).
Although the Board cannot set aside the judgement of manage-
ment merely because it would have handled certain expenditures
differently, the Board is empowered to disallow expenditures for
rate making purposes when they are due to dishonest, inefficient,
or uneconomical management. Transworld Airlines, Inc. v.
Civil Aeronautics Board, 385 F.2d 648, 656 (D.C.Cir. 1967), cert.
denied 390 U.S. 944 (1967) (upholding the Board's disallowance
of certain expenditures). Even though the burden of proof is on
the commission, the regulated company can be assigned the burden
of coming forward with information reasonably requested by the
regulatory body, which can use such data to make comparisons
between companies by providing adjustment for areas of difference.
Transworld Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 385 F2d
at 657-658. A utility commission could similarly review the
efficiency of test period expenditures without infringing on
the property rights of an electric utility company under its
jurisdiction. The Court noted that the efficiency standard under
the statute is "not fundamentally different from that applicable
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in conventional utility rate regulation where the commission may
disregard waste and improvidence but must not usurp the role of
management." Transworld Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics
Board, 385 F. 2d at 656.31 Although some state regulatory statutes
do not expressly require that efficiency be a consideration in
rate setting,32 the requirement that rates be "just and reasonable"
has been interpreted to include consideration of what revenues
would be required under "efficient and economical management."
Bluefield Water Works and Improvement Co. v. Public Service
Commission of West Virginia, 262 U.S. at 693.
The commissions seem to have both the constitutional and
statutory authority to disallow inefficient operating expendi-
tures. However, effective exercise of this power depends on the
ability of the commission to detect inefficiency and to present
evidence sufficient to satisfy the requirements of procedural
due process. Operating efficiency is the product of many deci-
sions some of which are made in day to day operations. The
commissions lack the resources to examine each decision and lack
the information to detect any but the more extreme cases of
inefficiency. Effective review of expenditures would require
virtual duplication of utility management on a commission level. 3 3
At best a commission can examine total expenditure in various
categories and, if they seem unreasonably large in comparison with
the level of similar expenditures in other utilities, the commis-
sion can demand an explanation. Even if the utility is unable
to explain the difference to the satisfaction of the commission,
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the commission must be able to establish the reasonableness of
the comparison if disallowance of the expenditure is to be upheld
by the courts. As discussed earlier, such comparisons are dif-
ficult to make since utilities rarely operate in the same service
area and differences in costs are at least as likely to be due to
characteristics of the service areas as to management efficiency.
Even if the commission can establish the reasonableness of certain
intercompany comparisons, only the more extreme instances of inef-
ficiency are likely to be discovered.
B. Exclusion of Imprudent Investments from the Rate Base
A public utility is entitled to a fair return on property it
dedicates for public use. But just as the commission may examine
operating expenditures the utility claims are necessary to
service the public, the commission need not accept without question
the amount of capital investment on which the utility claims a
return. Under due process a utility company is entitled to rates
"sufficient to yield a reasonable rate of return upon the value of
property used, at the time it is being used, to render the ser-
vices.. .But it is not entitled to have included any property not
used and useful for that purpose." Denver Union Stockyard Co. v.
U.S., 304 U.S. at 475; see also Federal Power Commission v.
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 315 U.S. 575, 590 (1942).
The commissions can exclude from the rate base an investment that
is not necessary for the services which the company is required
to provide to the public (Denver Union Stockyard Co. v. U.S.,
304 U.S. at 476-477) or property that once was but no longer is
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used and useful (Los Angeles Gas Co. v. Railroad 289 U.S. 287
(1933); St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. U.S., 298 U.S. 38 (1936))
or property that is acquired for future but no present use
(Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. California Public Ser-
vices Commission,401 P.2d at 255); Columbia Gas and Fuel Co.
v. Ohio Public Utility Commission, 292 U.S. at 406-407).
While the "used and useful" standard seems to have been
applied generally to exclude property that is not needed at the
time that rates are being fixed, there seems to be no obstacle
to excluding all or part of an investment as unnecessary because
it is an inefficient expenditure. Commissions have been permitted
to reduce the value of the rate base on the grounds that defects
or inadequate or poor design of facilities has resulted in inade-
quate service. North Carolina ex rel. Utilities Commission V-.
General Telephone Co. of the Southwest, 285 N.C. 671, 208 S.E. 2d
681, 689 (1974). As discussed earlier, due process does not
exclude inquiry into the efficiency of management decisions but
merely requires that the commission base any exclusion on substan-
tial evidence of inefficiency and not simply on the fact that the
commission members would have acted differently. Just as oper-
ating expenditures may be disallowed on grounds of inefficiency,
inefficiency capital investment presumably could be treated as
not "used and useful." Neither an operating expense nor a capital
investment is beyond scrutiny merely because it in fact was made
or used for the purpose of servicing the public. The Supreme
Court has suggested that efficiency may be a factor in determining
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whether an investment is used and useful. In McCardle v. Indian-
apolis Water Co., 272 U.S. 400, 411, (1926), the Court noted
that the reasonable cost of a system of waterworks, "well-
planned and efficient for the public service," is good evidence of
the value of a system for the purpose of determining the rate
base. See also Los Angeles Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission Calif-
ornia, 289 U.S. 287, 300 (1933).
As in the case of disallowance. of operating expenses, the
major obstacle to effective exclusion of inefficient capital invest-
ment appears to be the difficulty of determining whether a given
investment is inefficient and of assembling sufficient evidence
to back up such adetermination. However, review of long run
efficiency may be more feasible than review of short run effi-
ciency. While operating efficiency is the product of a vast
number of management decisions, which do not individually have
a major impact, long run efficiency seems to involve fewer
decisions, but each having a greater impact and fewer options.
Because of the huge size and cost of new facilities, particularly
generation facilities, a company makes relatively few important
investment decisions. Further, there is a limited number of
technological options available. Because of the importance of
any single capital investment, commission review of the major
investment decisions might have a significant impact on the long
run efficiency of a utility company. And by limiting itself to
major investments a commission would be better able to consider the
decisions in detail, enabling it to, make more refined judgements
as to their efficiency and have a greater impact than if opera-
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ting decisions were reviewed. 34
The economic effect of rate base exclusion is similar to
that of disallowance of expenditures. The commission forces the
company to increase efficiency when it excludes inefficient
investments because such exclusion reduces the rate of return on
actual investment. If allowed return is 10% but one fourth of
the company's investments are excluded from the rate base, re-
turn on total investment is reduced to 7.5%.
C. Refusal to Approve Securities to Finance Inefficient Investments
In many states regulatory statutes provide that a public
utility may not issue or sell securities without prior approval of
the state utilities commission.
In California:
"The power of public utilities to issue stocks...or
other evidence of interest or ownership and bonds ... or
other evidence of indebtedness and to create liens on their
property... is a special privilege, the right of supervision,
regulation, restriction, and control of which is vested
in the State, and such power shall be exercised as provided
by law under such rules as the commission prescribes." §816
"A public utility may issue .. .evidence of interest or
ownership, and... evidence of indebtedness payable at periods
of more than 12 months after the date thereof, for any one
or more of the following purposes and no other:
(a) For acquisition of property.
(b) For the construction, completion, extension,
improvement of its facilities.
(c) For the improvement or maintenance of its services.
(d) For the discharge or lawful funding of its obliga-
tions.
(e) For the reorganization or readjustment of its
indebtedness or capitalization upon a merger,
consolidation, or other reorganization.
(f) For the retirement of or in exchange for one or
more outstanding stocks.. .or other evidence of
interest or ownership..., or bonds.. .or other
other evidence of indebtedness of such public
utility...
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(g) For the reimbursement of moneys in the treasury of
the public utility not secured or obtained from
the issue of... evidence of interest or ownership
...or...indebtedness for the aforesaid purposes
except maintenance of service and replacement." §817.
"N6 public utility may issue evidences of interest or
ownership, or...evidences of indebtedness payable at periods
of more than 12 months after the date thereof unless.. .it
shall have first secured from the commission an order
authorizing the issue, stating the amount thereof and the
purposes to which the issue or the proceeds thereof are to
be applied, and that, in the opinion of the commission, the
money, property, or labor to be procured or paid for by
the issue is reasonable required for the purpose specified
in the order, and that...such purposes are not... reasonable
chargeable to operating expenses or to income." §818.
"(N)o public utility as defined in Section 201(e)
of the Federal Power Act...shall, without the consent of
the commission, issue notes payable at periods of not more
than 12 months after the date of issuance...if such notes
and all other notes payable at periods of not more than 12
months.. .would exceed in aggregate amount 5 percent of
the par value of other securities then outstanding." §823(c)
(Supplement 1975).
The Florida statute grants the Public Service Commission
"jurisdiction to regulate and supervise each public utility with
respect to its rates, service and the issuance and sale of its
securities-except a security which is a note..-.maturing not more
than a year after the date of such issuance..., and aggregating
( together with all other outstanding notes.. .of maturity of
one year or less... ) not more than five per cent of the par
value of other securities outstanding."§366.04.
The Michigan Commission is required to "grant authority
for issuance of securities" payable more than 12 months after
date of issuance if it is "satisified that the funds derived
from such issue.. are to be applied to lawful purposes (which
are essentially the same as those listed in the California statute)
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and that such issue and amount is essential to the successful
carrying out of such purposes." §460.301 (parenthesis added).
Securities payable not more than 24 months after issuance can be
issued for proper purposes without commission approval.
The New York statute provides that a utility may issue securi-
ties payable at a more than 12 months from issuance when necessary
for statutory purposes (which are also analogous to the purposes
lawful in California) provided that "there shall have been secured
from the commission an order authorizing such issue, and the
amount thereof, and stating the purpose to which the issue or
proceeds thereof are to be applied, and that, in the opinion of
the commission, the money, property or labor to be procured
or paid for by the issue...is or has been reasonably required for
the purposes specified in the order, and that... such purposes are
not...reasonably chargeable to operating expenses or to income."
§69 (Supplement 1974).
As an alternative to reviewing the efficiency of investment
decisions to determine which investments should be included in
the rates, it seems that a commission might prevent inefficient
investment by refusing to authorize securities proposed to raise
long term funds for nonoptimal investments. If the company is
merely seeking to refinance short term notes used to finance
construction, the refusal to allow financing through long term
securities (which is less costly) increases the borrowing expenses
of the company and reduces return if this increased cost is
disallowed. If the proceeds of the securities are to be used for
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initial funding of construction funds, refusal prevents construc-
tion.
While exercise of such authority would not seem to be
prohibited by federal due process, it is not clear that the regu-
latory statutes actually grant the commissions this authority.
The California, Michigan, and New York statutes require review of
the purposes to which proceeds of proposed issues are to be
applied. Proceeds must be for the purpose of financing acquisi-
tion or construction of facilities; the statutory purposes are not
limited to the financing of efficient facilities. So long as
the company proposes to use the proceeds to construct a facility
related to the provision of electricity, the requirement of
statutory purpose would seem to have been met.
However, the commission must also find that the amount of
the proposed issue is reasonably required or essential for a
statutory purpose. A commission might find that a facility that
a utility proposes to finance could be constructed at a much
lower cost and therefore that the amount of proposed securities is
not reasonably required. It would seem more difficult under the
statutory standard for a commission to refuse to authorize
securities where the type of plant the utility proposes to
construct does not embody the most efficient technology
(stilla statutory purpose) but the cost of construction is
reasonable for that type of plant.
The New York Commission has been upheld when it prohibited
the issuance of securities to finaftce facilities for which no
-55-
certificate of public convenience and necessity (which is
required by New York law prior to construction). People ex rel.
New York Edison Co. v. Willcox, 207 N.Y. 86, 100 N.E. 705 (1912).
But the court stressed that the certificate was a condition pre-
cedent to the right to construct and operate facilities. With-
out the certificate construction could hardly be considered a
statutory purpose. There is no statutory provision that expressly
makes commission review of the efficiency proposed facility a
precondition to the right to construct and operate the facility.
While the state statutes seem to limit commission review
to a determination of the purpose of the issuance and of the
reasonableness of the amount for such purpose, the commissions have
also used their power of disapproval to protect the interests of
investors in the soundness of the securities and consumers in
the cost of financing. The purpose of requiring commission
approval is the "prevention of corporate abuse and protection of
the public-against excessive rates for services, the overcapital-
ization and the watering of securities, the establishment of a
reasonable basis in operating expenditures, and the maintenance
of investment security." People v. Liberty Light and Power Co.,
121 Misc. 424, 201 N.Y.S. 302, 304 (1923). The commission should
limit the amount of issuance to the value of the property of
the utility. Hillsdale Light and Fuel Co. v. Michigan Public
Utilities Commission, 220 Mich. 101, 189 N.W. 893 (1922);
Smith, 45 California Railroad Commission 353 (1944). The commis-
sion must determine not only to what extent there is property
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of value behind the s-ecurities but also whether there is a reason-
able assurance that the company will be able to earn under
proper management a return on the securities. New York State
Electric and Gas Corp., 67 PUR(NS) 321, 342 (New York Public
Service Commission 1946); Bridge Bus Lines Corp., 40 California
Railroad Commission 542 (1937).
The commissions review the terms of proposed securities
to determine whether they are fair to existing and prospective
investors (Soledad Warehouse Co. , 49 California Public Utility
Commission 23 (1949); Associated Telephone Co., Ltd, 44 California
Railroad Commission 19 (1942); New York State Electric and Gas
Corp., 67 PUR(NS) at 351) and to ensure that the cost of financing
is not unreasonable (Consolidated Cargo Co., 42 California Rail-
road Commission 480, 482 (1940); Soo-Snows Railway Co., PUR1923B
430, 434 (Michigan Public Utilities Commission 1922); Brooklyn
Union Gas Co., 55 PUR(NS) 3 (New York Public Service Commission
1944)). Some commissions condition their approval of securities
on the use of competitive bidding in the sale of the securities.
Compulsory Competitive Bidding Rule,46 California Railroad
Commission 281 (1946); Case No. 4761, Decision Nos. 3814 (1946),
49941(1954), 81908 (1973) and Case No. 4761-5
(California Public Utilities Commission); New York Electric and
Gas Corp., 67 PUR(NS) at 354.
But the commission cannot deny or condition approval of
securities because of matters that do not go to the "marketability
or stability of the securities" since this would go beyond the
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statutory purposes of commission authority over securities
issues. Rochester Gas and Electric Corp. Maltbie, 273 App.
Div. 114, 76 N.Y.S. 2d 671 (1948), affd. 298 N.Y. 867, 84 N.E.2d
635 (1949) (overruling approval conditioned on writeoff of
excess of book value over actual cost of some purchased property
and on use of straight line depreciation). In Brooklyn Union Gas
Co. v. Public Service Commission, 8 A.D.2d 210, 187 N.Y.S.2d
207, 210 (1959), affd. 8 N.Y.2d 815, 202 N.Y.S.2d 322, 168 N.E.2d
390 (1960), the Court held that the Commission could not deny
approval of common stock under an option plan for officers and
key personnel merely because the Commission felt that the
device of a stock option plan was "not adaptable to the public
utility situation" since it would lend itself to "manipulation."
The refusal to approve the issue was upheld only because the stock
was to be used for compensation, which is an operating not a
capital expense and therefore under the statute could not be
financed through issuance of securities. Simflarly, a commission
might not be allowed to refuse to authorize securities to be used
for the construction of a facility merely because the commission
felt that the facility was not the most efficient type of
facility that could be built.
Only if a commission can show that the alleged inefficiency
of a proposed investment will adversely affect the marketability
or stability of the proposed securities could it refuse authoriza-
tion on grounds of inefficiency. In determining the value of fac-
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ilities that will underlie proposed securities the commissions
are not limited to the cost of the facility but may inquire into
its fair value. A commission could "consider whether the cost of
properties were reasonably incurred. To that end data on repro-
duction cost, fair value of tangible property, and original cost
are factors to be considered." Southern Nebraska Power Co.,
PUR1925B 278, 281 (Nebraska State Railway Commission 1824Y. A
commission might find that a facility which cost more than it
should because of poor planning or inefficient construction is
overvalued and limit new securities to the cost of an efficiently
planned and constructed facility. If the facility cost no more than
an efficiently constructed facility of that type but the commission
disagrees with the choice of type of facility or technology, the
commission might hold that the fair value of the facility is not
its cost but rather the cost of an efficiently constructed faci-
lity of another type, which would perform the same function at
a lower cost.
Whether the commission reviews the efficiency of capital
investments through the process of approval of long term securi-
ties or through determination of the rate base, the commission
must be concerned about the effect of such review on the risk
of investment and thus on the cost of capital. If the com-
mission waits until substantial resources of the utility have
been committed to a particular investment, the cost of excluding
it from the rate base so that no return can be earned on it or
of refusing to allow long term financing so that the comoany is
forced to use more costly short term financing may be so high
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that the commission is reluctant to use its powers of review.
While purchasers of utility securities already bear the risk
that the investment financed by these securities may be disal-
lowed from the rate base as not used and useful, if the commission
allows all investments that are related to provision of electri-
city, this risk is relatively low so long as management is not
dishonest and commits no gross errors of judgement.
But if the commission sets a stricter standard of review
which excludes investments that are used in servicing the public
but are inefficient or not optimal, the likelihood of disal-
lowance greatly increases. Investors might find that all or a
portion of the investment is excluded from the rate base, re-
ducing the rate of return on total actual investment. Since the
risk that a company will be unable to earn sufficient return on
invested capital is increased, investors will demand a greater
return before they will purchase any new securities, raising
the cost of capital that must be covered by the rates. If a
utility has borrowed significant amounts of short term capital
to finance new facilities, the likelihood that the company will
be unable to convert expensive short term financing to less
costly long term financing through the issuance of new securi-
ties is increased if the commission requires that the investment
meet a standard of efficiency. If rates are not increased to
cover the increased cost of borrowing to finance huge capital
investments that must be made, the resulting reduction in the
return of the company might be large enough to jeopardize the
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financial soundness of the company. Thus, it seems important to
review large capital investments before significant resources
have been committed and certainly as early as possible in the
life of a given investment.
Whether commission review of a given investment comes
earlier when review is in the form of a determination of the rate
base or in the form of authorization of securities depends on
the method of financing used by the company and on whether
uncompleted facilities are included in the rate base. If the
rate base includes facilities under construction or interest on
facilities under construction, the decision to make the investment
may be reviewed before construction is very far along. (Not
all states allow interest during construction or uncompleted
plant to be added to the rate base. See, e.g., North Carolina
ex rel. Utilities Commission v. Morgan, 179 S.e. 2d 419, 422-423
(1971).) If construction is initially financed through short term
debt, the commission authorization of issuance'of such debt is
usually not required. By the time the company requests permis-
sion to issue long term securities, it may have already invested
substantial capital in the project. Review of efficiency through
the process of exclusion of inefficient investments from the rate
base seems superior to efficiency review at the time the utility
is ready to issue long term securities since the former is more
likely to occur early in the construction of a given project.
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But since a utility might decide to raise capital initially
through long term securities rather than short term debt (e.g.,
New York State Electric and Gas Corp., 98 PUR(NS) 251 (1963)
(where a utility requested permission to sell long term securities
rather than using short term debt because of the favorable terms
then available on long term securities), -it may be important
that a commission be willing to review the efficiency of any
investment during either rate hearings or during hearings on pro-
posed securities, whichever occurs earliest in the life of a
given project.
D. Operating Ratio Regulation
Since an important potential source of utility inefficiency
is the relationship between company profit and the dollar value
of the rate base, it might seem desirable to shift away from
the rate base method of regulation. In the transit and trucking
industries operating ration regulation has been used instead
of rate base regulation because the major risk of such businesses
was perceived to lie in the operating margin, i.e., the margin
remaining after operating expenses, rather than in the amount of
fixed capital. Operating expenses consume a much greater portion
of revenues than return on the relatively small capital invest-
ment required in such industries and level of operating expenses
is much more volatile.35 Therefore, profit is fixed at a given
percentage of gross allowed revenues, which is calculated by
setting total allowed operating expenses as a percentage of
allowed gross revenues and subtracting the percentage from 100%.
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For example, an operating ratio of 95% (i.e., where operating
expenses are set at 95% of gross revenues), profit is 5% of total
revenues.
The operating ratio seems to have several conceptual weak-
nesses even when applied to a low capital investment. Other
than their capital investment, what is the contribution that
company owners make for which they deserve a return? Any
management services that they might provide are presumably
already compensated through salaries. Any additional compensation
must be for the use of their capital and logically such return
should vary with the risk of the investment and the amount they
have put at risk and not with gross revenues. Even if dollar
return is determined by an operating ratio the prospective
equity investor has to convert the operating ratio to a return on
capital before he can evaluate the desirablility of the investment
and compare it with alternative investments. And it is also
important for the commission and the public to calculate the return
on capital that is inherent in the allowed operating ratio since
an operating ratio that appears reasonable on its face may
actually conceal an unreasonably high rate of return. For example,
dollar return on capital may only be 5% of total revenues but if
revenues equal $1,000 and invested capital equals $50, the return
on capital is 100%. A major reason for the use of the operating
ratio method seems to be that it emphasizes the size of expenses
relative to revenue rather than rate of return, with the result
that commissions tend to allow an operating ratio that yields
-63-
a higher return than they would accept if they directly set the
rate of return.3 6
Further, the use of an operating ratio would seem to ex-
acerbate rather than ameliorate the problem of inefficiency. If
profit is a percentage of gross revenues, return increases when
all expenses, operating and capital, increase. The incentive to
minimize any expenses is thus diminished. 37
E. Varying Allowed Rate of Return With Level of Efficiency
If a utility company knew that its allowed rate of return
would depend at least partially on its efficiency during the
previous rate period, it would seem to have a strong incentive to
maximize its efficiency. The effect on short run efficiency would
be similar to the effect of disallowance of inefficient operating
expenses in that under either procedure revenues remaining after
operating expenses and interest are reduced when the commission
discovers that inefficient expenditures have been made. If the
expenditures are disallowed, the actual rate of return is
reduced only if the disallowed expenditure is repeated or the
allowance for some other category of operating expense is exceeded.
But if the rate of return is adjusted based on the performance of
the utility during the rate period, the utility is penalized
during the next rate period regardless of whether the inefficient
expenditures are repeated.
Similarly, inefficient' capital investment decision would be
penalized. The effect of varying the rate of return with long
run efficiency would be similar to'the effect of excluding inef-
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ficient investments from the rate base. The rate of return on
total invested capital is reduced if inefficient investments are
made. The commission would continue to allow a relatively
low rate of return until operating or investment efficiency is
improved. Direct adjustment of rate of return provides greater
flexibility for the commission than indirect adjustment through
disallowance or exclusion since once an expenditure or investment
is disallowed or excluded, it would seem difficult for a commission
in a future rate review to hold that, because of improved overall
efficiency, the expenditure or investment will be recognized as
legitimate and included in the new rates.
Rewarding Efficiency With Return Above the Cost of Capital
The ability of a commission to vary allowed rate of return
is limited by federal due process. In Bluefield Water Works and
Hope Natural Gas the Supreme Court held that a public utility
was entitled to rates that would permit it to earn a return on
capital commensurate with the returns earned on investments of
comparable risk and sufficient to ensure the financial soundness
of the utility so that it can maintain its credit and attract
capital. However, since the cost of capital cannot be precisely
determined and since the commission and not the courts, were
delegated the responsibility to set rates, there is no single rate
of return that is reasonable to the exclusion of all other rates
of return. Instead there is a range of returns or a zone of
reasonableness within which a commission must select the return to
be allowed to a particular utility.' Montana-Dakota Co. v.
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Northwestern Public Service Co., 341 U.S. 246, 251 (1951);
Michigan Bell Telephone Co. v. Michigan Public Service Commission,
332 Mich. 7, 50 N.W.2d 826, 834 (1952). A commission can set the
allowed rate of return at the high or low end of the zone depend-
ing on how efficient the company appears to be. E.g., Public
Service Coordinated Transport, 5 N.J. 196, 74 A.2d 580,595 (1950);
New England Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. State, 104 N.H. 229,
183 A.2d 237 (1962); LaSalle Telephone Co. v. Louisiana Public
Service Commission, 245 La. 99, 157 So.2d 455, 458 (1963).
The effectiveness of the incentive for cost cutting created
by the rewarding of an extra margin of return for efficiency
depends first on how significant a margin can be offered by the
commission. It is difficult to determine exactly how much vari-
ation in return the courts would allow or how wide the commis-
sions assume the zone of reasonablness to be since few court or
commission opinions expressly delineate its boundaries. It is
often stated that the rate of return cannot be "more than the
reasonable worth of the service supplied" nor "so low as to be
confiscatory." E.g., Public Service Coordinated Transport, 74 A.2d
at 595. Since the courts recognize that rate setting is primarily
the duty of the commissions and therefore tend to defer to the
judgement of the commission so long as it is supported by the
evidence, the zone of reasonableness includes "a substantial
spread between what is unreasonable because too low and what
is unreasonable because too high." Montana-Dakota Co. v.
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Northwestern Public Services Co., 341 U.S. at 251.
Given sufficient discretion, a commission can sufficiently vary
the rate of return in relation to company efficiency so that
utilities will try to maximize their efficiency. If a company
succeeds in reducing its costs, it immediately realizes savings
since its actual costs are then lower than the anticipated costs on
which the rates then in effect are based. When the commission
reexamines the rates and determines the test period costs that must
be covered by the new rates, the amount of allowed expenses is reduced
to reflect increased efficiency but the company retains a portion of
the savings produced by its increased efficiency in the next rate
period through an increase in the allowed rate of return for that
period. The company continues to enjoy extra return so long as it
maintains its superior level of efficiency. If its performance
declines, the commission may reduce the return to a slower point
within the zone of reasonableness. While each company is concerned
that if all companies raise their level of efficiency commission
standards for rewarding additional return may rise, no company is
willing to reduce its cost cutting efforts for fear it will be the
only company unable to meet a higher standard once it is set. Also,
it would sacrifice additional return that it could realize from
further efficiency under current standards.
Even assuming that the extra margin of return available is
sufficient to induce management efforts to meet the requirements
set by the commission, greater efficiency will result only if the
commission is able to effectively ahd accurately evaluate utility
efficiency and thus know when to award a higher rate of return.
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Those commissions that claim to reward efficiency generally do not
reveal how they determine the level of efficiency. Rewards of
higher rates of return seem to be based on the commission's general
impressions as to the adequacy of service and the level of costs.
The Florida Public Service Commission in General Telephone Co.
of Florida, 44 PUR3d 247, 255 (1962), made one of the few attempts
to expressly formulate a standard for measuring efficiency: "a public
utility is operating efficiently if it has a minimum number of service
complaints, is continually improving service, but is still able to
produce earnings on lower rates than comparable or similar utilities
in the same general area." But utilities even in the same general
area may have very different service areas in terms of load distribu-
tion, density of customers, distribution between residential and
industrial or commercial customers, and other factors that are at
least partially beyond the control of management. Apparently no
attempt is made to adjust the cost data of "comparable" utilities
before a comparison is made.
It is doubtful that other commissions use a standard that is
much different from or more sophisticated than the Florida standard.
Thus, what is perceived as differences among utilities in efficiency
may not be due to relatively higher or lower levels of management
efficiency. Rewards based on factors beyond management control will
not elicit greater efforts by management; if efficiency is not what
is actually rewarded, efficient behavior is not what will be
elicited.
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Further, the Florida standard rates companies as either "effi-
cient" or "inefficient" and apparently makes no distinctions as to
degree of efficiency or inefficiency. Only if one company exceeds
a second company on all three criteria is it clearly the more
efficient. The standard seems to be aimed at a determination of
which utilities have achieved some reasonable level of efficiency.
Once a company reaches that level, there is little incentive to
improve further since it is doubtful that the standard is sufficiently
sensitive that a commission would notice the difference.
If rewards of higher return are based on a commission's general
impressions of a company's efficiency, the utilities may direct their
efforts more toward public relations and public image than toward
real improvement in their operations. There would seem to be a
greater incentive to achieve the more visible and immediate types
of cost reductions than those which could have a significant
cumulative effect over time. In summary, the incentive for efficiency
will be weak if the companies feel that the commission can not really
tell if they are more or less efficient.
Even assuming that the commission can measure the efficiency of
a utility, one last condition for the creation of effective incentives
is a strong expectation on the part of company management that
their cost cutting efforts will in fact be rewarded in future rate
hearings and some concert of the amount of that reward. Given the
analysis of company efficiency in commission opinion, it seems that
few commissions have formally committed themselves to a policy of
rewarding efficiency, much less to-a scale of rewards based on the
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degree of efficiency. Without a more formalized program of rewards
for efficiency a company is less likely to be able to force a
commission through the courts to grant the reward it has earned in
the event that the commission is unwilling to allow additional
return which it has granted other companies for increased efficiency.
If, based on the precedent set by past instances where the commission
rewarded efficiency, a court is willing to require higher return for
a company that met the commission's standard of efficiency, court
review of the commission's determination as to whether that standard
had in fact been met would be largely ineffective if the standard
is based on vague and subjective judgments. In reviewing commission
decisions courts are unwilling to substitute their judgments for
those of a commission. If a commission decision is based on some
objective and explicit criteria, a court is more willing to overrule
the decision on the grounds that the commission did not meet its own
standards. If court review of commission decisions is made too
difficult because of the failure of the commission to explain why and
how much it is adjusting rate of return, a court might overturn the
commission's decision as arbitrary and capricious. A commission
cannot avoid review merely by concealing in a vague opinion
exactly what actions it has taken. City of Los Angeles v. Public
Utilities Commission, 102 Cal.Rptr. 313, 497 P. 2d 785, 795 (1972)
(requiring the commission to specify the amount of rate of return
that it is rewarding for efficiency); North Carolina ex rel.
Utilities Commission v. Morgan, 277 N.C. 255, 177 S.E.2d 405, 418
(197), affd. 278 N.C. 235, 179 S.E: 2d 419 (1971) (requiring the
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commission to specify the effect given in a rate decision to
inadequacy of service).
Ironically, the attempt to reward efficiency through a higher
rate of return could increase the incentive for inefficiency.' As
discussed earlier, since return is a function of the rate base, a
company might find it profitable to expand its capital investments
beyond the optimal point if the allowed return on capital is greater
than the cost of capital. The incentive to increase the rate base
is dampened considerably by the effects of inflation. See supra.
section IV(B). But the extra return awarded for past efficiency
might raise the return sufficiently above the cost of capital to
induce future long run inefficiency. Once the commission realizes
that company efficiency has declined and that the company no longer
deserves a higher return, the company would find itself both without
the extra return for which it made the additional investment and
burdened with the higher level of fixed capital costs resulting from
the investment.
But if a commission can measure nothing more precise than gross,
overall efficiency, it may take many inefficient decisions on the
part of management before the commission's favorable impression of
company efficiency is changed. Management would not feel under
pressure to maximize efficiency and would feel free to overinvest
so long as it avoided gross inefficiency that might be easily dis-
covered. But, as noted earlier, efficiency of investment decisions
may be more easily evaluated than operating efficiency so that
careful commission review of majorcapital investments could
-71-
discourage overinvestment and rewards of additional return would
encourage efficiency.
The potential counterproductive effects of rewarding extra
margins of return to equity raises the question of why the stock-
holders should be the beneficiaries of increased company efficiency.
The management, not the stockholders, controls daily operations and
makes the investment decisions. The stockholders tend to become
involved in company affairs only when earned return to equity is so
low as to be unacceptable. Even then their involvement is probably
limited to choosing a new management rather than directly affecting
operating or investment practices.
Increased return to stockholders is merely an indirect method
of inducing management to act in the desired manner. From the point
of view of the stockholder, the extra return is a windfall if the
allowed return without the efficiency reward is adequate to meet the
cost of capital. By definition a return just equal to the cost of
capital (which is the lowest end of the zone of reasonableness)
provides sufficient return to attract equity capital and meet the
expectations of equity investors. Anything above that return is
unnecessary to keep them satisfied and to attract additional needed
capital.
The commission's evaluation of the company's efficiency might
have a greater impact on company management, and thus on company
policy and practices, if a portion of the reward for efficiency were
paid directly to management. The impact would be greatest if a
portion of the basic salary of management personnel was dependent on
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the efficiency achieved by the company. It is not likely that the
courts might hold that commission involvement in management salaries
violates the due process rights of what is still a privately owned
company. Due process is largely a procedural requirement, and the
courts have apparently not overturned statutes allowing a commission
to disapprove and make ineffective contracts made by a utility with
an affiliated company. E.g., New York §110(3)(requiring filing of
management, construction, engineering, or similar contracts with
affiliates and authorizing the commission disapproval of contracts
found not to be in the public interest). If a commission can set
standards that must be met if contracts for goods or services with
affiliates are to become effective, a commission may also be able to
make certain requirements as to management employment contracts
without violating due process.
But specific statutory authorization for such actions would be
required by the courts even if due process is not an obstacle. The
power to disallow expenditures for rate making purposes, which is
inherent in the power to set just and reasonable rates, does not
include authority to regulate the terms of utility contracts other
than contracts to provide utility service. Pacific Telephone and
Telegraph Co. v. Public Utility Commission, 34 C.2d 822, 215 P.2d (411)
(1950); General Telephone Co. of Upstate New York, Inc. v. Lundy, 218
N.E.2d 274. As an alternative to modifying the terms of management
employment contracts, a commission might disallow a portion of
expenditures on management salaries on the grounds that management
had not run the company efficiently and should be paid no more than
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the value of their services. Such disallowance would reduce return
on capital but not directly affect management compensation.
A commission might reward management efficiency through bonuses
rather than through basic salary. Commissions already grant "bonuses"
to stockholders by allowing extra margins of return for past effi-
ciency. The California Public Utilities Code §456 specifically
authorizes the Commission to allow a utility to "profit" from "any
economies, efficiency, or improvements which it may make" and to
distribute such profits "by way of dividends or otherwise" when the
Commission deems it "wise for the purpose of encouraging economies,
efficiencies, or improvements." Other commissions have been held to
have the power to grant extra return to encourage efficiency although
their enabling statutes contain no explicit authoriziation. E.g.,
Public Service Coordinated Transport, 74 A.2d at 595; New England
Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. State, 183A.2d 237; LaSalle Telephone
Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 157 So.2d at 458. But
by granting bonuses to management, a commission would in effect be
ordering a utility to use a portion of its allowed return to increase
management salaries. The courts might well require specific statutory
authorization before they would uphold commission authority to make
such an order.
Penalizing Inefficiency by Reducing Return Below the Cost of Capital
A second way of increasing management concern over the commis-
sion's evaluation of its efficiency would be to penalize utilities
for their inefficiency by reducing allowed return below the cost of
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capital or denying a rate increase necessary to increase actual
return to at least its cost of capital. Several commissions have
refused to grant rate increases that they deemed to be reasonable or
necessary until the companies brought their service up to an
acceptable level. E.g., Key System Transit Lines, 17 PUR3d 505,
509 C1957), Citizens Utilities of California, 4 PUR3d 97, 104 (1954)
(California Public Service Commission); New York Telephone Co., 84
PUR3d 319 (New York Public Service Commission 1970). But few com-
missions explicitly set the rate of return at a level below the
zone of reasonableness. But see Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph
Co., 26 PUR3d 55, 113 (Louisiana Public Service Commission 1958).
Two major legal objections have been raised against the reduction
of rate of return below the zone of reasonableness in order to force
more adequate service. First, some courts have held that the
statutory powers to review the adequacy of service and to set just
and reasonable rates are separate and that, in the absence of express
statutory authorization of joint consideration of service and rates,
no power to consider the adequacy of service in a rate hearing will
be implied. Florida Telephone Corp. v. Carter, 70 So.2d 508 (1954);
General Telephone Co. v. Michigan Public Service Commission, 341
Mich. 620, 67 N.W.2d 882 (1954)(This decision may not be applicable
to regulation of electric utility rates since the statutory provisions
for electric utility regulation provide that the Commission, in
determining rates, may consider, among other things, the "value of
service to the consumer." §460.557); Elyria Telephone Co. v. Public
Service Commission, 158 Ohio St. 441, 110 N.E.2d 59 (1953). Only
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after the Florida statute was amended by the addition of the
following provision did the courts allow the Florida Commission to
withhold approval of rate increases until service was improved (see
United Telephone Co. of Florida v. Mayo, 215 So. 2d 609 (1968), appeal
dismissed 394 U.S. 995 (1969)):
"In fixing the just, reasonable and compensating rates...
the...Commission is authorized to give consideration, among
other things, to the efficiency, sufficiency, and adequacy
of the facilities; provided that no public utility shall be
denied a reasonable rate of return upon its rate base."
§366.041(1).
However, other courts have held that the power to consider
adequacy of service when setting rates is necessarily incidental to
the authority of commissions to require utilities to provide
adequate service at just and reasonable rates. E.g., New Jersey
Traction Co. v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 96 N.J.L. 90,
113 A. 692, PUR1921D 391, 398 (1921); North Carolina ex rel. Utilities
Commission v. General Telephone Co. of the Southeast, 285 N.C. 671,
208 S.E. 2d 681, 685 (1975)(holding that the statute is a "single,
integrated plan", whose provisions must be construed together so as
to accomplish its primary purpose'). This seems to be the more
reasonable interpretation of the state regulatory statutes. The
Florida and Michigan cases holding to the contrary were based on a
strict interpretation of their respective statutes. Although the
Michigan statute vests the Michigan Commission "with complete power
and jurisdiction to regulate all public utilities in the state," as
to "all rates, fares, fees, charges, services, rules, conditions of
service, and all other matters pertaining to the formation, operation,
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or direction of such public utilities..."(§460.6 Supp. 1974),
the courts considered this provision merely an "outline of juris-
diction" of the Commission and not "a grant of specific powers."
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Michigan Public Service Commission,
351 Mich. 255, 88 N.W.2d 492, 497 (1958). Apparently only powers
specifically granted could be exercised by the commission.
The more prevalent view is that the regulatory commission has
only powers expressly or impliedly conferred by statute although
any reasonable doubt as to the lawful existence of a particular
power must be resolved against the commission. E.g., City of Cape
Coral v. GAU Utilities Inc. of Florida, 281 So. 2d 493 (1973). If
the courts are unwilling to allow commissions to exercise authority
necessarily implied by statutory language and provisions, legislative
intent will be easily thwarted since a legislature is unlikely to
successfully enumerate each and every power necessary to accomplish
the objectives it sets for the commission. Fogarty Brothers Transer
Inc. v. Boyd, 109 So2d. 883, 886 (1959). The court in Florida
Telephone Co. v. Carter apparently did not agree that the power to
consider service in a rate hearing was necessarily implied by the
responsibility to ensure adequate service at reasonable rates. But
the attempt to separate service and rate review seems illogical. How
can a commission determine whether a particular rate is reasonable
if it cannot examine what is being offered at that price? Rates are
not just and reasonable if they are more than what "the services
rendered...are reasonable worth." Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 547
(1898).
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The argument that consideration of management efficiency is
inherent in the express authorization of commissions to set just
and reasonable rates is at least as strong as the argument that
the power to consider adequacy of service is implied by commission
rate making authority. State commissions are permitted to disallow
unreasonable operating expenses and to exclude unnecessary capital
investments for rate making purposes, although often neither action
is expressly authorized by statute. It is doubtful that a court
would hold that efficiency cannot be considered in a rate review.
Due process is a much stronger obstacle to attempts to tie
rates to quality of service or to level of efficiency. Due process
requires that rates be reasonable, i.e., that they cover operating
expenses and yield a reasonable return, which is one that is commen-
surate with returns on investments of corresponding risks and
sufficient to attract capital. On its face, this constitutional
requirement seems to require that a return at least equal to the
cost of capital be allowed regardless of the adequacy of service or
any other considerations. Most courts that have allowed commissions
to deny rate increases because of inadequate service have stopped
short of holding that the allowed rate of return could be set below
the cost of capital, which is the lowest end of the zone of reason-
ableness. E.g., North Carolina ex rel. Utilities Commission v.
General Telephone Co. of the Southeast, 208 S.E.2d at 688 (holding
that, since the current rates were not confiscatory, it was not
necessary to decide whether a rate increase could be denied if current
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rates provided a return at the confiscatory level); Baltimore
Transit Co. v. Public Service Commission of Maryland, 206 Md. 533,
112 A.2d 687, 697 (1955) (holding that value of service may not be
relied on to set return outside the zone of reasonableness); New
Jersey Central Traction Co. v. Board of Public Utilities Commissioners,
113 A. at 400 (upholding a refusal to increase rates where the
commission found that, if the utility was properly equipped and
operated so as to provide good service, the current rates would
produce sufficient revenue to cover operating expenses and yield
a fair return on capital).
Some courts have held that rates set at the maximum "reasonable
worth" of the service rendered cannot be confiscatory regardless of
the resulting return on capital. E.g., Gay v. Damariscotta-Newcastle
Water Co., 131 Me. 304, 162 A. 264, 266 (1932); Hamilton v. Caribou
Water Light and Power Co., 121 Me. 422, 117 A. 582, 584 (1922). In
Market Street Railway Co. v. Railroad Commission of California, 324
U.S. 548 (1944), the Supreme Court upheld a commission refusal to
raise rates above what the commission found to be the "value of the
service" although the company could not earn an economic return as
required by Hope Natural Gas. On its face, this holding seems to
permit a commission to reduce return below the cost of capital where
the quality, and thus the value of the service, was sufficiently low.
However, the Court found that this was not a case of a commission
denying a company the opportunity to earn a return sufficient to
attract capital. The company's financial condition was so serious
that it could not attract capital at "any possible rate." Due process
requires only that rates and return be set to make it "possible for
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the company to operate successfully." Due process does not guarantee
that a profit will be earned so a commission can set rates that
yield a return that does not meet the Hope Natural Gas standard if
"that is all the company can earn." Market Street Railway Co. v.
Railroad Commission of California, 324 U.S. at 566. Although the
company was unable to earn sufficient return, even with a rate
increase that had been recently granted, the commission set rates
back to the previous lower level because the higher rates had caused
patronage of the company to decline. Since the higher rates did not
bring better service, the price of the service had exceeded the value
the public put on it and the company was not receiving increased
revenues under the increased rates. "Under these circumstances the
Commission did not put a monetary value... (on the service) as the
basis of the fare... Certainly the due process clause of the
Constitution is not violated when a commission takes into consideration
practical results to the public of advances which it has allowed in
rates." Market Street Railway Co. v. Railroad Commission of California,
324 U.S. at 563 (parenthesis added). Clearly, the Supreme Court
created a very limited exception to the Hope Natural Gas standard and
did not hold that inadequacy of service could be grounds for denying
a rate increase necessary to bring return up to the cost of capital.
One of the few cases to hold that service inadequacy could
justify a confiscatory return is D.C. Transit System, Inc.v. Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Commission, 466 F.2d 394, 419 (D.C. Cir.
1972), cert, denied 409 U.S. 952 (1972). Tn holding that "the
utility's fulfillment of its service commitments is a sine qua non
00
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to constitutional protection under confiscation principles," the
Court seemed to embrace a contract theory of rate regulation. The
legislature through the commission promises to allow rates reason-
ably calculated to yield in the future gross revenues sufficient
to meet operating expenses and provide a return on investment at
least equal to the cost of capital and in exchange the utility
promises to provide adequate service to meet the public needs. See
Citizens Utilities Co. of California, 1 PUR3d 244, 247 (California
Public Utilities Commission 1953). As with any contract, when one
party fails to substantially perform as it promised, the other
party is entirely relieved of the duty to perform its promise and
may seek damages. A contract itself may provide relief in case of
breach so long as such liquidated damages are not merely punitive
but reasonably reflect actual injury. 38
However, the D.C. Transit System decision does not go so far
as to hold that rates may be "scaled in proporti-)n to the public
worth of the utility's service." D.C. Transit System, Inc. v.
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission, 466 F.2d at 422.
The Commission had found that management decisions had resulted in
an unstable financial structure that contributed substantially to
seriously deteriorated service and uneconomic and inefficient
operations. Because of its financial condition the company was
unable to replenish its capital stock or provide sufficient personnel
but had ignored previous Commission warnings of the need to improve
its capital structure and failed to comply with orders to purchase
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new equipment. In the opinion of the Commission, a rate increase
alone would not remedy the situation. Although it found that a
rate increase was necessary to provide a nonconfiscatory rate of
return, the Commission, as a precondition to any rate increase,
required that the company raise $2.4 million for the purchase of
new equipment through other than debt securities and reduce out-
standing debt by $4 million. The Court did not hold that rates
could be reduced because of poor service but only that a rate
increase necessary to raise return above the confiscatory level
could be postponed until service improvements were made. Such
postponement was not contrary to due process since "(a)ction
rationally subserving a substantial governmental concern draws
condemnation on due process grounds only if it is arbitrary or
unreasonable." D.C. Transit System, Inc. v. Washington Metropolitan
Area Transit Commission, 466 F.2d at 422 and n. 313.
The contract theory is applicable to cases where a commission
attempts to set a confiscatory rate of return because of company
inefficiency. Since it is the statutory duty of a utility to provide
adequate service at reasonable rates, it violates that duty if it is
inefficient and so requires higher rates than otherwise necessary.
The failure to perform would be even clearer if the utility operates
in a state whose statute specifically requires that service be
efficient. E.g., Florida, §364.03.
The Hope Natural Gas and Bluefield Water Works standard does
not preclude such a theory since neither of those opinions was
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addressed to the case of a utility that was found to be inefficient.
Further, in Bluefield Water Works the Court required that return be
"adequate, under efficient and economical management, to maintain and
support its credit and enable it to raise the money necessary for the
proper discharge of its public duties." Bluefield Water Works and
Improvement Co. v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia, 262 U.S.
at 693 (emphasis added). Under this standard commissions can disallow
expenses that are uneconomic and exclude from the rate base portions
of investments that are unnecessary and calculate the cost of capital
based on a hypothetical capital structure. Such actions have the
effect of reducing earned return on actual capital invested even to
the point where earned return is less than the company's current cost
of attracting such capital. Due process onlyrequires that the utility
have the opportunity when operating in an efficient and economical
manner, to earn a return equal to the cost of capital; an inefficient
company is not guaranteed such a return. If a commission can reduce
earned return on actual investment below the company's cost of capital
through disallowance or exclusion or use of a hypothetical capital
structure, why should it be a violation of due process to accomplish
the same end by directly reducing the allowed rate of return below the
cost of capital? The Supreme Court in Federal Power Commission v.
Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. at 602, noted that a commission "is
not bound to the use of any single formula or combination of formulae
in determining rates...Under the statutory standard of 'just and
reasonable' it is the result reached not the method employed which
is controlling...If the total effect of the rate order cannot be said
to be unjust and unreasonable, judicial inquiry...is at an end."
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It seems that a commission could penalize inefficiency by
disallowing expenses, excluding investment, and/or reducing the
allowed rate of return below the cost of capital so long as the
net effect under the rates set by the commission is that an
efficient company could earn a return at least equal to the cost
of capital under a reasonable capital structure. The Hope Natural
Gas standard does not preclude the use of any particular method to
arrive at this result but it does limit the extent to which a com-
mission can penalize an inefficient company. A commission could
not disallow all inefficient expenditures, exclude all unnecessary
investments from the rate base, determine the optimal capital struc-
ture and then also set an allowed return below the cost of capital
under such a capital structure. This limitation on the penalty that
a commission can extract for inefficiency seems anlogous to the
contract doctrine, previously noted, that damages for breach must
be limited to actual damages (which in the case of an inefficient
utility is the higher cost of service that the public would have to
bear if rates were set at a level necessary to meet all actual expen-
ditures and provide an earned return on actual capital invested equal
to the actual cost of acquiring such capital) and that liquidated
damages will not be enforced if they are merely punitive.
Sliding Scale Rate of Return
One attempt to set up a system of rewarding efficiency was
the sliding scale rate of return, which was used in several American
cities, most notably Washington, D.C. Allowed return is tied to the
-85-
level of actual earnings in the previous rate period. First the
commission sets an initial rate level which will yield sufficient
revenues to meet test year operating and interest costs and to
yield a reasonable rate of return. If the company cuts its costs
during the rate period, its actual rate of return will then be
higher than the allowed return for that period. When rates are
again reviewed by the commission, recognized costs are reduced to
reflect the efficiency achieved in the past rate period but allowed
rate of return is raised to reflect the higher than expected
earnings in that period. For each incremental increase in actual
rate of return above the allowed return for that period, the return
allowed for the next rate period is increased by a predetermined
percentage of the excess return. For example, in Potomac Electric
Power Co., 48 PUR(NS) 437, 442 (District of Columbia Public Utilities
Commission 1943), the Commission and the company agreed that if
rates yielded net revenues in excess of 6% on the rate base, rates
would be adjusted so as to reduce revenues by:
50% of the excess over 6% return and not in excess of 7.25%;
60% of the excess over 7.25% return and not in excess of 8%;
75% of the excess over 8%.
If return was less than 5 1/2% for a twelve month period or less
than 5 3/4% in each of two consecutive years, the Commission would
increase rates to yield a 6% return.
Although one of the alleged virtues of the sliding scale method
was that it provided incentive for efficiency, the primary reason
for its adoption, at least in the pistrict of Columbia, apparently
4,4
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was that such an automatically functioning system of rate making
might reduce the need for time consuming and complex hearings. 39
Allowed rate of return would be set according to the terms of the
sliding scale and the terms of the scale would be reviewed only
periodically. The D.C. Commission planned to review the terms of
the sliding scale once every ten years.
While concern over efficiency was not the primary reason for
its use, the sliding scale seems to increase the incentives for
efficiency. With or without the sliding scale the company retains
all savings from cost cutting through the end of the rate period.
When rates are set for the next rate period, a commission using a
sliding scale splits these savings between the company and the public
by reducing allowed costs to reflect 100% of the savings but
increasing allowed rate of return to include a portion of the
cost savings, according to the terms of the sliding scale. If rate
of return is not adjusted upward, the utility loses all of the benefit
of its cost cutting and has less incentive to increase its efficiency.
No limit is put on the return a company might be allowed as a result
of such sharing of efficiency savings so that the incentive for
efficiency does not vanish as the company's allowed return approaches
a ceiling. Once a company reached a ceiling on allowed return, the
company can receive no greater reward in the next period for greater
efficiency. There might be a temptation to reduce efficiency in
hopes that the commission would not notice the reduction and would
set allowed costs at a higher than the most efficient level,
permitting the company to maximize bfficiency in the next rate period
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and retain as profit that portion of revenue incorrectly allowed by
the commission.4 0
Sliding scale regulation is really a more formalized version of
a policy of awarding extra return to companies that appear to be
efficient and, like such a policy, it creates an efficiency incentive
whose effectiveness depends on the sufficiency of the reward, the
accuracy with which the commission detects the level of efficiency,
and the degree to which the company can be certain that efficiency
will in fact be rewarded. Although adoption of a sliding scale
strengthens expectations of reward, the sliding scale, as conceived
in Washington, D.C., is not based on a reliable measure of efficiency.
Company net earnings is no more accurate a measure of efficiency
than comparative price level or general impressions of the level of
efficiency. Many factors other than management efficiency will
cause fluctuations in company earnings. The D.C. Commission found
that increased customer density and better load distribution due to
rapid population growth in the Washington area caused allowed return
under the sliding scale to skyrocket to politically unacceptable
levels, necessitating a downward adjustment in the terms of the scale
long before the expected ten year review. Potomac Electric Co.,
8 PUR3d 76, 96, (District of Columbia Public Utilities Commission,
1955). Inflation had the opposite effect. Rates of return dropped
so low that the Commission and the utility company agreed to abandon
use of the sliding scale. Potomac Electric Power Co., 8 PUR3d 76,
96 (District of Columbia Public Utilities Commission 1955).
-88-
One of the few attempts to adjust utility cost differences for
factors beyond the control of management was made by William Iulo
in his study, Electric Utilities: Cost and Performance (Olympia:
Washington State University Press 1961). Through regression analysis
the portion of interutility cost differences that was explained by
factors external to management activities was subtracted from the
total variation in actual output costs. That portion of cost
differences that remained (which in Iulo's study was 20% of the total
cost variation), was assumed to be accounted for by differences in
management efficiency.41
Since the efficiency measure is a residual of unit output cost
after the effect of certain factors has been removed, the choice of
such factors is determinative of the accuracy of the measure. Only
if all factors beyond management control, and only if such external factors
have been removed can the measure be accurate. Of the factors
selected by Iulo as external to management to be tested for their
significance in explaining interutility variability, only the
following were found to be significant: size of steam generation
unit, percentage utilization of capacity, cost of fuel, percentage
of customers that are residential and percentage commercial or
industrial. Among the other factors that Iulo tested were: size of
enterprise as measured by total assets, total property, total electric
utility property, total kilowatthour sales, or generating capacity;
cost of construction; level of technology as measured by fuel consumed
per unit output; cost of debt, type of generation; relative use of
purchased and self-generated power;, capital investment; wage rates;
consumption density of the service area; and geographic location. 42
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These factors were selected because Iulo felt that they were
not amenable to rapid change by management.4 3 Iulo was concerned
with efficiency under a relatively short time perspective. As
one moves from measuring short run efficiency to measuring long
run efficiency, the number of factors that management cannot affect
diminshes and virtually every factor examined by Iulo can at least
be modified by management. Even price levels and consumption
patterns can be affected to some extent through contract negotiations
and pricing policies.4 4 Since there are likely to be tradeoffs
between short and long run efficiency, one must select a time per-
spective with which to view and measure efficiency. Once a time
perspective is chosen, Iulo's factors must be refined to the extent
that they are wholly or partially amenable to change by management.
For example, the factor, fuel cost should be the general market level
of price rather the particular price paid by a utility company so
that if the utility negotiated a price above or below the general
market price, the effect of such negotiations would remain in the
residual cost after the external factors are removed.
Closely related to the problem of the choice of "external"
factors is the problem of selecting a method of measuring the chosen
factors. Only if an accurate method of factor measurement is used
will the effect of the factors be accurately accounted for. While
lulo uses fuel per unit output as a measure of level of technology,
he expresses doubt as to whether this is a sufficiently accurate
measure. If the measure is not at least a good approximation, the
effect of level of technology will'not be removed from the residual
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output cost and perhaps some factor that should have remained in
the residual will be inadvertently eliminated.
If the problems of selection of external factors and method
of measurement of such factors can be overcome, Iulo's efficiency
measure might be used in a sliding scale system to replace company
earnings as the variable on which allowed return is based. For a
given reduction in adjusted output cost (i.e., actual output cost
less than portion of cost variation of a given company over time
that is explained by management efficiency), the commission would
agree to increase the rate of return a given portion of the savings.
It should be noted that, while Iulo's study compared intercompany
cost differences at a particular point in time, a sliding scale
would be based on intracompany cost comparisons over time, which
might change the external factors found to have a significant effect
on actual unit output cost. For example, while at any given time
all utilities might tend to have a similar level of technology so
that technology explains little of intercompany cost differences,
technology used by any single company might change significantly
over time and therefore would be important in explaining intra-
company cost variation.
Using Iulo's efficiency measure and given the constitutional
limits set by Bluefield Water Works and Hope Natural Gas, a commis-
sion might set a minimum efficiency level necessary for a utility to
be allowed a return equal to the cost of capital and vary allowed
return from that level of return depending on the variation of
-914
company efficiency relative to the minimum efficiency level.
Although the resulting sliding scale might provide an objective
method of rewarding extra return, it could not be applied
mechanically. Since the measure of efficiency is based on the
residual after the effect of all known external factors is removed,
the measure could include the effect of unrecognized or incorrectly
measured external factors as well as management efficiency. The
measure is not an infallible measure of efficiency but merely
refines the analysis a commission would make in appraising a
utility's level of efficiency. The commission would have to
examine each utility to determine if the Iulo measure of efficiency
should be adjusted for the particular circumstances of a utility's
operations.45 In order to satisfy due process requirements a
commission must demonstrate that its appraisal of company efficiency
is a reasonably accurate one and supported by substantial evidence.
A court must be convinced that the efficiency measure on which a
sliding scale is based reasonably approximates the level of manage-
ment efficiency and does not instead reflect factors beyond manage-
ment control for which management should not be rewarded or penalized.
Mechanical application of the sliding scale also might raise
other due process problems. Some courts have held that the refusal
to increase the rates until service is improved is arbitrary and
unlawful where such a refusal would make it difficult for the
utility to improve its capital equipment. E.g., Elyria Telephone Co.
V. Public Utilities Commission, 110 N.E.2d at 62. The court in
Elyria Telephone held further that ,service could never be considered
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in a rate case under the Ohio statute but many of those courts that
have held that rates could be affected by adequacy of service also
held that poor service did not require that the commission refuse
to increase rates. A commission might conclude that a rate increase
is "an appropriated step in the improvement of the service," (North
Carolina ex rel. Utilities Commission v. Morgan, 177 S.E.2d at 41)
or that one cause of poor service might be the inability to attract
capital due to inadequate rates (Askew v. Bevis, 283 So.2d 337, 340
(1973); Township Committee of Township of Lakewood v. Lakewood Water
Co., 54 N.J. Super. 371, 148 A.2d 885 (1959); Village of Apple River
v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 18 Ill.2d 518, 165 N.E.2d 329, 333
(1960)).
It does seem unreasonable for a commission to find that service
is inadequate or inefficient because of insufficient or deteriorating
capital equipment and condition a rate increase on improved service
or efficiency and then to fix the rate of return at so low a level
as to make it virtually impossible for the company to acquire new
capital. In effect what the courts are holding is that a commission
cannot require a company to do the impossible. E.g., City of Elizabeth
v. Board of Public Utilities Commissioners, 123 A. 358, PU 1924C 524,
527 (1924) (holding that a utility was under no obligation to obey a
commission order to make certain capital improvements where return
was insufficient to attract the necessary capital). This argument
would not apply to the case where a commission conditioned a rate
increase on improved service or efficiency which could be achieved
without significant capital outlay.,46 Thus, a commission applying a
-93-
sliding scale or any other policy of varying return with efficiency
must be careful not to penalize inefficiency to the point of pre-
cluding the possibility of the improvement required by the commission.
A commission might agree to raise rates gradually as the company
shows evidence of good faith efforts to improve efficiency.
It is also important that a commission periodically review the
terms of any sliding scale to refine the scale so that it will
yield reasonable returns. The first attempt at setting the terms
of the scale may well have to be modified in light of experience under
sliding scale regulation. Rewards for efficiency, for example, might
have to be adjusted downward if overly generous rewards resulted in
an unreasonably high rate of return. And the allowed rate of return
of any particular company must remain sufficiently below the maximum
within the zone of reasonableness so the company will continue to
have an incentive to further improve its efficiency. In order to
preserve flexibility as to the terms of the sliding scale, the
commission should not adopt a sliding scale in the form of a contract
between the commission and the utility company, as was done in
Washington, D.C. Instead, if a sliding scale were to be used, it
should be promulgated as a formal policy or rule of the commission.
Even if the commission retains the ability to make adjustment in the
terms of the sliding scale, the promulgation of a policy of sliding
scale regulation would provide some certainty that a utility would
be rewarded in a reasonably predictable manner for increased
management efficiency.
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Assuming a commission can overcome the methodological diffi-
culties in creating a sliding scale system, its statutory duty to
set just and reasonable rates would seem to grant authority for
the commission to adopt such a system in setting rates. Some state,
statutes specifically permit the use of a sliding scale although
they seem to envision an automatically functioning sliding scale
such as that adapted in Washington, D.C., rather than a sliding
scale policy requiring adjustments by the commission in light of
the particular circumstances of each rate case. E.g., California
§457 (permitting a utility to enter "into an agreement for a fixed
period for the automatic adjustment of charges...in relation to the
dividends to be paid to stockholders of such corporation'; New York
§65(4) (analogous to the California provision) and §66(16) (permitting
automatic adjustment of rates for a period not more than four years
based on the relationship between net income and fair value of
property used and useful); Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated §66.1147
(1959) (permitting a sliding scale of rates or other methods for the
"automatic adjustment" of rates "as shall prov'ide a just and reason-
able return on the fair value of the property used and useful").
F. Promulgation of Standards for Utility Performance
Rather than attempting to encourage efficiency by a system of
incentives and disincentives, a commission might order the utility
to act in a particular manner that the commission has determined
embodies maximum efficiency. A performance standard sets require-
ments which management must satisfy or be faced with fines or a
reduction in the rate of return. Three aspects of performance standards
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must be examined before any conclusion can be drawn as to their
feasibility: the scope of review inherent in a standard; the
dimensions of performance that are regulated; and the all or nothing
quality of compliance with their requirements.
Scope of Review
The management and operation of an electric utility can be
conceptualized as a pyramid of decision making, beginning at the
top with relatively few major decisions, which will significantly
affect company operations perhaps even over a period of several
years, followed by more numerous decisions with less impact, and
ending at the base with relatively numerous, even daily, decisions,
each affecting primarily the immediate activities in the context
of which they are made. These decisions interact in that a series
of relatively minor decisions may effectively determine the resolu-
tion of a more major problem and a major decision in turn must be
carried out through, and so determines the content of many smaller
decisions.: The broader the decision, i.e., the more decisions and
decision makers it affects, the higher up in the management hierarchy
it tends to be made.
Since performance standards require that management decision
making achieve certain results, the use of standards necessarily
implies commission review of the management decision for which
standards are set. The more important the decision for which a
standard is set (i.e., the higher in the decision pyramid such
standard intervenes), the greater the number of decisions the
standard indirectly affects and the greater the effect such standard
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is likely to have on overall company efficiency. A decision as to
the technology to be used in new generation facilities has more far
reaching consequences for efficiency than does a decision as to
management salaries or as to the timing of shut down periods for
generation plants for maintenance and inspection. Thus, for a
commission to ensure that efficinecy is at a given level, many more
decisions would have to be reviewed if the standard is directly
concerned with intermediate or low -level decisions than if the
standard directly concerns high level decisions.
It is important to minimize the number of decisions that
a commission must review since, as the scope of necessary review
grows, so too does the size of the bureaucracy necessary to carry
out that review. At a certain point the commission would have to
virtually duplicate the management structure of the utilities it
regulates. While the commission might realize economies of scale
through centralization of decision making for all utilities in the
state, clearly the bureaucracy necessary to develop and enforce
standards for a large portion of company decsiion making would be
immense.
As the size of the commission staff approaches the size of
company management staff and more of company decisions are directly
reviewed by the commission, it seems logical to eliminate the
duplication and have the commission directly manage the company, i.e.,
to put the utilities under public ownership. However, it is not
clear that public management would be any more efficient than private
management. Unless one assumes that managers hired by the government
-97-
will all be so public spirited that they will automatically
seek every possible means of maximizing efficiency (and this
seems no more likely to be true than an assumption that all
private managers will be imbued with a professional management
ethic that dictates maximization of efficiency), the government
faces the same problem of motivating efficiency maximizing
behavior on the part of managers it selects as it faces with
private managers.
Review of decision making does carry the risk that it may
interfere with the effectiveness of business decision making and
thus create the very inefficiency it was meant to eliminate. By
necessity many important business decisions are not objectively
precise or verifiable but instead involve discretion and business
intuition. Management must make decisions as to actions that will
be affected by future conditions about which they can make only
educated guesses. Time is often of the essence so the decision must
be made despite great gaps in their knowledge of important factors.
If they waited until the gaps were filled in, the decisions would
come too late to be implemented. For example, because of long lead
time necessary in the construction of new generation plants estimates
of demand must be made relatively far into the future and electric
systems planned assuming a given level of future demand and con-
struction costs. Commission standards and review may discourage
innovative and independent thinking persons from being managers and
may stifle exercise of creative discretion. The delay involved in
review may prevent some decisions from being finalized in time. But
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these problems are inherent in any review and do not mean that
there should be no review of decision making but only that the
scope of review should be as limited as possible to achieve the
desired effect on efficiency.
Dimensions of Performance
Performance standards can vary not only as to the scope of
review they imply but also as to the choice of dimensions of
company performance that they regulate. The choice of dimension
affects the extent to which a particular standard leaves to the
company the determination of how best to meet commission require-
ments. A standard for overall efficiency that sets a maximum unit
output cost would give management broader discretion than a
standard prescribing a particular capital-labor mix or maximum fuel
cost or maximum energy loss over transmission lines. The Mich-
igan Public Service Commission has considered setting a series of
standards relating to construction planning and implementation,
financial planning and performance, utilization of electronic data
processing equipment, utilization of work force and labor-management
relations, safety practices, and purchasing practices. 4 7
Since maximization of efficiency or minimization of output price
is the ultimate goal of efficiency performance standards, the use of
a single cost standard avoids the problem of setting multiple standards
that may be incompatible with each other and with the purpose of
using standards. Just as unit output cost sums the effects of all
levels of decision making, unit cost also is the net product of
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decisions affecting all dimensions of company performance. While at
any given point the targets set for various dimensions of company
performance may be compatible with each other and with cost minimiza-
tion, as conditions change the targets may begin to conflict. For
example, if the cost of labor rises, a company attempting to meet
a labor productivity standard (output per labor dollar) may have to
reduce labor per unit capital to the point that capital productivity
(output per capital dollar) falls below its required level. Or an
attempt to reduce operating costs to the targeted level result in
overly intensive use of capital (and thus reduced efficiency) as
plants become increasingly automated.
Unless the commission adjusts the various standards, incompati-
bilities may arise, particularly if there is a large number of
standards. Conflicts can also arise among standards involving
different levels of decision making since decision making on one
level affects and is affected by decisions made on other levels.
The need for constant readjustment of standards to ensure mutual
compatibility only adds to the burden on commission staff and
resources.
Although regulation of an entire national economy certainly
creates problems of a much larger scale than regulation of a single
industry in a single state, the Soviet experience with performance
standards provides some insight into the difficulty of setting
compatible standards. The Soviet economy is fully planned; national
performance standards or targets set by a five year plan are
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elaborated into targets for each plant and each industry. Prices
are fixed by the government rather than by the market and goals are
set in terms of labor productivity, total output, total wages paid,
total investment, introduction of new technology, and product
assortment. Management bonuses which make up a significant portion
of management salaries are awarded upon achievement of the targets.
In order to ensure that certain targets are not pursued to the
neglect of others, some are made preconditions for the award of
bonuses for the achievement of other targets.
Prior to 1965 output was measured in physical terms such as
yards of cloth or tons of appliances and not in terms of market
value. But it was found that in trying to meet output targets
managers were producing cloth that was long but too narrow and
appliances that were too heavy. Physical output goals were achieved
at the expense of satisfaction of consumer needs, which was the
ultimate goal of consumer goods production.49 For this reason after
1965 the output targets were rephrased in terms of value instead of
physical measures and profitibility was introduced as a measure of
performance.50 But since prices do not reflect true market value
these changes have apparently not solved the problem of conflicting
targets.51
The difficulty of ensuring compatible performance standards
does not mean that a unit output cost standard is the only feasible
standard. On the contrary, the difficulty of measuring management
efficiency through cost data (see supra. section V(E)) may dictate
the use of standards based on other,dimensions of company performance.
It may well be easier to set standards for certain types of decisions,
-101-
e.g., capital investment decision, than for overall efficiency.
But the fewer the standards required by the commission, the less
intractable the problem of ensuring that they are not inherently
inconsistent.
The choice of the levels of company decision making and the
dimensions of company performance that are to be regulated by per-
formance standards raise questions both of due process and
statutory authority. It is doubtful that regulation of particular
dimension of performance or type of decision is per se contrary to
due process. While there may be a limit on the amount of company
decision making that a commission can review without violating the
property rights of the owners of the company, it is more likely that
due process is satisfied if commission review has a rational purpose
(e.g., increased utility efficiency) and the standards are grounded
in substantial evidence of their rationality. No new statutory
authority would be necessary if the standards are to be merely rules
of thumb used by the commission in disallowing expenses, excluding
investment from the rate base, or setting return but then a company
could not be penalized merely for failing to meet the standards. It
would have to be demonstrated that the violations caused inefficiency
and that the company was not able to achieve a comparable level of
efficiency through its own methods of operation. But if the per-
formance standards are to be precise requirements that must be met by
the company, standards could be set only for those aspects of
company performance which the commission is specifically authorized
by statute to regulate.
Many states grant authority over utility operating practices
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and facilities but the extent of authority varies. In California
whenever the Commission,
"after a hearing, finds that the rules, practices, equip-
ment, appliances, facilities, or service of any public
utility, or the methods of manufacture, distribution,
transmission, storage, or supply employed by it are unjust,
unreasonable, unsafe, improper, inadequate, or insufficient,
the commission shall determine and, by order or rule, fix
the rules, practices, equipment, appliances, facilities,
service, or methods to be observed, furnished, constructed,
enforced, or employed." §761
The California Statute also authorizes orders: for addition, repair,
or change in physical property to promote the security or convenience
of employees or the public (§762); and for safety devices and
construction and operation of facilities to safeguard the health and
safety of employees and the public (§768(Supplement 1975)).
The Florida Public Service Commission has the authority:
"to prescribe fair and reasonable...standards of quality and
measurements, and service rules and regulations to be
observed by each public utility;...to require repairs,
improvements, additions and extensions to the plant and
equipment of any public utility reasonably necessary to
promote the convenience and welfare of the public and
secure adequate service or facilities." §366.05(1); see
also '§366.06(3).
"If the Commission determines that there is probable cause
to believe that inadequacies exist with respect to the
energy grids developed by the electric utility industry,
it shall have the power after finding that mutual benefits
will accrue to the public utilities involved, to require
installation or repair of necessary facilities." §366.05(8)
(Supplement 3, 1973).
The statute that abolished the Michigan Public Utilities Com-
mission and replaced it with the Michigan Public Service Commission
was intended to grant the new commission "precisely the same powers
as the old." Huron Portland Cement Co. Michigan Public Service
The jurisdiction of the MichiganCommission. 88 N.W. 2d at 497.
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Public Utilities Commission included "the control and regulation,
i'ncluding the fixing of rates and charges, of all public utilities
within the state, production, transmitting delivering, or furnishing
steam for heating or power...purposes for public use." §460.54. The
only specific grant of authority over facilities or practices refers
to electric utilities engaged in the "business of transmitting and
supplying" electricity. §460.555 (authority to order improvements
in "method" employed as necessary to secure good service and safety
of public and employees) and §460.557 (authority to fix "just and
reasonable rules and conditions of service"). Other than the
provisions as to rates and charges, no other provisions refer to
authority over generation activities of any public utility.
The New York Public Service Commission is granted much broader
authority. The Commission has the power to:
"examine or investigate the methods employed by...(electric
corporations) in manufacturing, distributing, and supplying...
same, and...to order reasonable improvements as will best
promote the public interest, preserve the public health, and
protect those using such.. .electricity and those employed in
the manufacture and distribution thereof:" §66(2), and
"prescribe...the efficiency of the elctric supply system, of
the current supplied and of the lamps furnished by...corpora-
tion...generating and selling electric current." §66(3).
Most of the statutory provisions seem to provide only limited
authority for performance standards. Most are concerned with safety
not efficiency, or refer to regulation of quality of service to the
public rather than operating and investment practices. A commission
would probably have to seek statutory amendments before it could
implement a program of performance standards.
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The All or Nothing Quality of Compliance
Performance standards that set limits on unit output cost as
a measure of efficiency, seem to resemble the sliding scale and
other methods of inducing efficiency by varying return with
efficiency level. However, one fundamental difference remains
between the two approaches. While a commission varying rate of
return with efficiency relies on the incentives and disincentives
it creates to induce the companies to be as efficient as they can,
a commission using performance standards dictates what level of
efficiency the companies must reach. Even if the orders are enforced
by direct or indirect (e.g., through fines which are disallowed in
rate making) reduction in the rate of return, this difference
between an incentive and an order system of regulation remains.
For an order system to achieve maximum efficiency the goals
ordered must be neither impossible nor too easy to reach. If the
commission has made requirements that are less than the manager is
capable'of achieving, he has no reason to continue improving once
he has reached the required level since he gets no greater reward
for surpassing the goal. In fact, he has every reason to stop his
efforts since the commission will base its next set of goals on
whatever evidence it has of the capabilities of the company and a
level of overachievement is likely to become the minimum requirement
for the next period.52 The manager will then have to work even
harder in the next period and with a greater risk of failure and for
no greater reward than if he had not exceeded the initial standard.
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If a manager is faced with what he sees as an impossible
goal, he has no reason to even try to reach it since he is rewarded
only if he actually reaches the goal and is penalized no matter how
close he gets to it. Although he may not realize at the beginning
of the goal achievement period that the goal is not within his
capabilities, as he attempts to meet the requirement, the further
the goal is from what is feasible, the sooner he is likely to
realize the uselessness of his efforts. He might decide not to get
too close to the goal since the lower the capabilities of the company
appear, the lower the standard is likely to be for the next period.
Because the commission must set goals for the future, the stan-
dards are unlikely to be more than roughly accurate. And the more
accurately the standards are to reflect the efficiency capabilities
of the utility, themore detailed and precise the information the
commission must collect. Because of the difficulties and cost of
getting sufficient, accurate information and setting accurate
standards, the likelihood of accuracy in goal setting seems rela-
tively low while the consequences of error are serious.
An incentive system poses similar problems of information
collection and accuracy but mistakes are less likely to adversely
affect the level of efficiency. Since all reasonable costs of the
company are covered by the rates, it should not be difficult to set
rewards high enough to elicit efforts at increasing efficiency. The
more important problem is to avoid setting incentives at too high a
level so that the company recaptures a larger portion of the
efficiency savings than necessary to induce efficiency efforts.
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While it is undesirable for the public to pay the company any
amount more than the minimum necessary to induce efficiency
maximization, even in the event of error the public will still
benefit from improved efficiency, although less than if no error
had been made. The problem of the all or nothing quality of
performance standards dow not preclude their use but suggests that
they should be limited in their application.
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VI CONCLUSION
Rate base regulation does create some incentive for operating
and investment efficiency in that savings from reductions in the
actual operating cost and capital investment ratios below the
ratios of the test period are retained by the utility until rates
are again reviewed. Increases in these ratios during the rate
period reduces the rate of return. But this incentive is reduced
as regulatory lag is shortened and, in the case of long run
efficiency, is at least partially offset by the ability to earn
excess return by overinvestment.
None of the methods of increasing efficiency alone provides
a solution to the problem of creating sufficient efficiency incen-
tive. What seems to be required is a combination of the various
methods. It is clearly important that a commission disallow
inefficient expenditures as test year expenses although its ability
to discover inefficiency seems limited to the more extreme cases.
A commission has broad legal authority to disallow unnecessary and
inefficient expenditures, limited primarily by the requirement
that grounds for disallowance be supported by substantial evidence.
Inefficiency in capital investments poses a more serious problem
than operating inefficiency since overinvestment may be inadvertantly
rewarded when allowed return exceeds the cost of capital. While the
efficiency of all investments should be scrutinized when the rate
base is determined, it seems desireable to review major investments
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in facilities before substantial resources have been committed
to their construction. Such review could take place in the
context of rate base determination (if uncompleted plant or
interest on plant under construction is included in the rate base),
or review of securities but in order to ensure early review of
such projects it seems more appropriate to require review of the
feasibility and efficiency of major investments in a separate
hearing before any construction has begun, just as, in many
states, they are reviewed as to their location and environmental
impact. E.g., California Public Resources Code §§25000-25903
(Supplement 4, May 31, 1974); Florida §§403.501 - 403.515 (Supple-
ment 1974); New York §§120-130 (Supplement 1972), and §§140-143
(Supplement 1974). Whether a commission sets up performance
standards for such investments or uses such standards as rules of
thumb, additional statutory authority to conduct a separate effi-
ciency review.
A commission also should institute a formal policy of rewarding
more efficient companies an extra margin of return varying with the
degree of efficiency. Such apolicy does run the risk of increasing
allowed return sufficienty above the cost of capital that over-
investment is stimulated but careful commission review of major
capital investments in the context of rate base determination,
securities review, or separate efficiency review of proposed
facilities could substantially reduce the opportunity for over-
investment. Particularly in an inflationary economy, an extra margin
of return is of great value to management and would provide significant
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incentive for operating and investment efficiency. In order to
make such incentives most effective, commissions must develop an
efficiency indicator or measure. The most promising method
evaluating efficiency seems to be the approach developed by Iulo
but it does require assemblage of large amounts of data.
Commissions could improve their ability to evaluate efficiency
simply by being careful to temper their comparisons of the costs
of various utilities with consideration of factors external to
management efficiency. Whether or not the Iulo approach is used
formally, intercompany comparisons would be facilitated by collec-
tion of data on utilities in and outside of the state as to
various components of output cost, e.g., investment in generation
and transmission and distribution facilities, labor costs, admin-
istrative cost, fuel cost, return to equity, interest on debt.
Such data would make it easier to pinpoint causes of cost
differences.
Although reduction of rate of return below the cost of capital
does not seem to be per se contrary to due process, it may be more
difficult to avoid violation of the due process limitation if allowed
rate of return is directly reduced below the cost of capital than
if it is indirectly reduced by disallowance of inefficient operating
expenditures and exclusion of inefficient investment from the rate
base. If a commission reduces allowed operating costs and rate base
to the levels that would be required by an efficient company and then
sets allowed return at the cost of capital, it is clear that due
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process has not been violated. Rates have been set so as to provide
a company under efficient management the opportunity to earn a
reasonable return.
This is more difficult to demonstrate if instead of disallowance
and exclusion, or in conjunction with some disallownace and exclusion,
the allowed rate of return is dropped below the cost of capital. In
order to determine if due process has been violated, one must compare
the rates resulting from this approach with the rates that would
result if one calculated the levels of expenditure, investment, and
returnwhich would be necessary for an efficient company. The com-
mission might as well use the latter approach in the first place.
But a company may be unwilling or unable to penalize inefficiency
to the full extent of its legal authority. While in a competitive
market inefficient producers are penalized by declining profit and
eventual bankruptcy, the importance of electricity to the public
and dependence of thepublic on the existing utility in each service
area precludes a commission from allowing such an extreme economic
result. In a sense when the public through the commission penalizes
a company for being inefficient, it is penalizing itself since the
ability of the company to provide electricity at reasonable rates
is further impaired by any decline in the financial health of the
- company. Within certain limits the return to equity can be
directly or indirectly reduced without seriously jeopardizing the
financial standing of a healthy company. When utilities are
weakened because of inflation, regulatory lag, and public opposition
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to rate increases, the ability of the commission to exact punish-
ment for past or present inefficiency is greatly reduced.
A commission could increase its ability to penalize
inefficiency if a portion of the reward-punishment system were
administered through management salaries.53 If a portion of
management salaries depended on the efficiency level achieved by
the company, management, and not the company as a whole, would
suffer the consequences of management inefficiency. Statutory
amendments would be required to implement such a policy.
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